Clausewitz: The Debate Continues

MICHAEL H. CRESWELL


Charles Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780–1831) was a Prussian military officer, military theorist, and writer on military affairs. His most famous work is Vom Kriege, known in the English-speaking world as On War.2 Absent this book, few today would even know of Clausewitz. Its publication, however, has cemented his place in history, as it remains in print and a topic of debate almost 200 years after his death. Few authors are so fortunate.

Beyond his writing life, Clausewitz was also a man of action. A lifelong soldier, he entered the Prussian service at age twelve as a lance corporal and first saw combat at age thirteen, fighting the campaigns of the First Coalition arrayed against revolutionary France. At the peak of his career, in 1818, Clausewitz reached the rank of major general3 and was named director of the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, where he had been a student from 1801 to 1804. In between finishing at the top of his class there and becoming director, he was appointed aide-de-camp to Prince August Ferdinand of Prussia, the commander in chief of the Thirty-fourth Infantry Regiment. More consequentially, Clausewitz became a protégé of Lieutenant General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, the Kriegsakademie’s then head. Under Scharnhorst’s mentorship and protection, Clausewitz not only survived politically in the conservative Kingdom of Prussia but also thrived intellectually.4

In his position as aide-de-camp, Clausewitz took part in the Battles of Jena-Auerstädt (in October 1806), in which Napoleonic France pummeled the Prussian Army; captured both the crown prince and Clausewitz; and, subsequently, forced Prussia to cede half of its territory. While in captivity in France, Clausewitz had the opportunity to observe another society first-hand and reflect on the catastrophe visited on his own country. Released in late 1807, he resolved to reform his homeland.

Despite his professional accomplishments, Clausewitz remained somewhat on the margins of Prussia’s elite throughout his career. He witnessed great events and lived in historic times, yet he was more of an observer than a decision maker or key participant. More important, Clausewitz had acquired a reputation as a radical, a dangerous thing in a conservative state. His supposed radicalism stemmed from his desire to reform the Prussian state. Although Prussia was a great power, it was the least powerful among the European powers, a fact confirmed by its wholesale defeat at the hands of France. Clausewitz believed that Prussia had failed to tap into the great energy and enthusiasm that lay dormant in its people and that this failure helped account for the country’s military defeats. He wanted to awaken Prussia’s potential by giving the Prussian people a role in the state. This popular energy—nationalism—is what had enabled France to dominate Europe militarily. Creating something similar in Prussia, however, would mean overturning the existing political and social status quo, anathema to those who held power. It is easy to see why Clausewitz was mistrusted.5

Thanks to Scharnhorst, however, Clausewitz was promoted and protected politically, holding positions that afforded him time to think and write. Blessed with both a
philosophic and a practical sensibility, Clausewitz sought to understand, and not merely recount, the great transformation of war unleashed by the French Revolution and exploited by Napoleon. France became a nation in arms, in which everyone contributed to the war effort, willing to fight and die for flag and country. France’s new army sought combat in an effort to destroy the enemy army, a stark contrast to the unwieldy monarchical forces of the age of limited warfare, which, instead, tried to maneuver in and out of strong points in order to avoid decisive battles. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Clausewitz did not see the new style of warfare as large-scale chaos. Rather, he tried to strip away the transient elements of war in order to reveal its basic logic and structure.

To this end, he worked over the years on what would eventually become On War, putting down the manuscript when duty called him away but always returning to it and further refining his thoughts. He eventually produced an entire draft. Then, he began to generate a fresh copy incorporating his revisions. He never finished these revisions, however, as he succumbed to cholera in 1831. It was left to his widow, Marie, assisted by her brother, Lieutenant General Friedrich Wilhelm von Brühl, and Major Franz August O’Etzel, to publish Carl’s unfinished work.

The reception accorded On War since its publication has evolved. Initially, its readership was largely limited to Prussia. However, after Prussia’s impressive military victories over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870–71, Clausewitz was widely embraced throughout Europe. Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke, the architect of Prussia’s victories in the Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), counted On War among his chief intellectual influences. In France, which was on the receiving end of Prussia’s newfound military prowess, the French attempted to uncover the roots of their rival’s success by reading what the Prussians had read. On War, thus, found its way into the curriculum at the École de Guerre.

Interest in Clausewitz extended into the twentieth century. Ferdinand Foch, marshal of France and supreme commander of the Allied armies in the First World War, had lectured on Clausewitz at the École de Guerre in 1901. Across the English Channel, the British journalist and writer Sir Basil Liddell Hart also cited Clausewitz, blaming him for the butchery of the Great War. After their defeat in 1918, the Germans, still licking their wounds, once again turned to Clausewitz for salvation. So, too, did Russia’s new leaders: Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky. The former appreciated Clausewitz’s subdivision of war to policy, whereas the latter endorsed Clausewitz’s use of the dialectical method. Lenin’s nemesis, Josef Stalin, disagreed, declaring in 1946 that the Prussian was out of date. Yet, after Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in 1956, Clausewitz made a comeback in Soviet thinking, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason alone.”

For Clausewitz, war was, ultimately, an act of “policy”—i.e., the rational extension of a state’s power. Though not a warmonger, Clausewitz saw war as a normal and legitimate expression of state interest. According to this point of view, wars begin, evolve, and end for reasons of policy and politics. Policy and politics are, thus, not external to war but, rather, part of its intrinsic nature. This key insight led Clausewitz to reach his greatest intellectual achievement: the so-called “trinity.”

“War,” wrote Clausewitz, is “a paradoxical trinity—comprised of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason alone.” Each of these three elements—rational, arational, and irrational—is mainly associated with one segment of society: the rational element with the government, which provides the reason for the war; the arational element with the commander and his army, who operate in chance and uncertainty; and the irrational element with the people, who provide the conflict with passion.

Together, these three elements comprise the political aspect of war.

The relationship between these three tendencies varies. Therefore, the statesmen’s task is to ensure equilibrium, as any imbalance can lead to military defeat. Clausewitz cautioned that any theory that ignores an element of the trinity is “useless.” The task he set himself was to “develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.”

This task is both supremely important and very difficult. War involves interaction between two sides’ trinities, with each side attempting to manage the shifting relationship between the elements of its own trinity and also to influence its adversary’s trinity. The fluctuation of these tendencies is inherently unpredictable, ebbing and flowing during the...
On War has long been a polarizing figure. Notwithstanding their rather different interpretations of On War, soldiers, statesmen, and scholars such as Moltke the Elder, Gen Colin Powell, and Sir Michael Howard have praised its insights and elevated it to the forefront of the strategic canon. Their enthusiasm has been matched by the hostility of writers like Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Sir John Keegan, and Martin van Creveld, who have condemned Clausewitz as bloodthirsty, misguided, and obsolete.

What accounts for these vastly different views of On War? Differing interpretations of Clausewitz’s meaning is a major source of these variations. Most obviously, On War is unfinished. The first book is the only one Clausewitz was able to revise before his death, so he was unable to incorporate his matured thinking on other aspects of his subject into the work. Confusion also arises regarding when he wrote two notes to supplement the manuscript. The first is a note dated 1827 and the second is an undated and unfinished note in which he wrote that only book one and chapter one was finished. The point in time at which one believes the second note was written can influence one’s interpretation of the book.

Another reason for the disparate interpretations is that Clausewitz was as much a philosopher as a strategist. In particular, he employed the dialectical method of reasoning, offering a thesis, then its antithesis, leading to a third thesis: a synthesis. Some readers see the thesis followed by the antithesis as evidence of Clausewitz contradicting himself, rather than as an attempt to arrive at the essence of something by determining the elements that separate the two propositions.

Finally, Clausewitz wrote about his own experiences, which were bound to a particular time and place. A product of the Enlightenment also influenced by the Romantic era, Clausewitz fought in large-scale conventional ground wars before the advent of mechanization and air power, at a time of great upheaval in Europe. In other words, he wrote about what he knew and did not spend much time talking about other forms of warfare. As in many other situations, context explains a great deal.

The debate about Clausewitz continues. In the two books under review, Clausewitz’s ideas are reassessed. The author of one book charges and convicts Clausewitz for leading the US Army disastrously astray, whereas the coauthors of the other find On War still useful, though out of date.

Retired from active duty with the US Army, Stephen Melton is currently a faculty member at the US Army’s Command and General Staff College in Leavenworth, Kansas. He has produced a well-written book, The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward), that he hopes will stir debate. On this point, he succeeds.

Melton contends that the US Army has historically relied on attrition warfare for its success. Unfortunately, he argues, the army’s obsession with Clausewitz has diverted it from a winning strategy and into the predicament in which the country currently finds itself: “We have failed in Iraq because the army no longer understands how offensive wars are won” (9). The author blames Clausewitz for providing a flawed framework that undergirds the army’s “neo-Clausewitzian doctrine of Full-Spectrum Operations” (9).

In response, his book is “an attempt to rediscover a framework for understanding warfare that is based on the enduring truths recorded across the broad historical record” (9). He contends that drawing on these lessons will enable the army to resolve the problems that confront it (5–6, 8–9). He proposes the creation of a “single academic agency responsible for seeing, conceptualizing, verifying, and recording, and disseminating a complete and coherent picture of how wars are won at the operational and strategic level” (xiii). This proposition, however, seems doomed from the start.

First, why should the army alone control this agency? After passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, joint operations, in which all the US armed forces coordinate their actions, has been enshrined into law. Given that they will take part in any conflict, the other services will surely demand to have a voice in determining how that conflict will be fought.

Second, what specific lessons are to be learned? Many scholars argue that history offers no lessons. It is a grab bag that can be used to prove almost anything. Moreover, the lessons that military professionals draw from earlier conflicts often fit their own preconceived notions. Debates continue over every past conflict; how, then, are we then to draw lessons from them to guide us in the heat of current or future wars? In addition, what role will civilian academia play in interpreting the past? Such debates over who has the right to interpret US military history date back to the nineteenth century.

Another point Melton advances concerns the use of body counts as a key metric of attrition warfare. He surveys the historical record and notes that there have been instances when societies have been unable to replace those killed by combat (21–24). Melton is to be commended for bravely taking up a topic largely discredited by the Vietnam War. Even if he is correct, though, what practical insight does this concept offer the US Army? Should the army seek to reach a tipping point at which its opponent begins to decline demographically?

To be sure, we live in an era in which the United States will probably not fight any large-scale conventional wars. It is difficult to imagine any opponent playing to the United States’ strong suit. Instead, the country will most likely face nonstate actors who attempt to fight asymmetrically. Such actors do not seek conventional victories on the battlefield but, rather, aspire to gain adherents to their political and social agenda. In other words, they fight a battle for hearts and minds.

Accordingly, the liberal application of US firepower against its enemies, with the goal of inducing demographic decline, is a losing strategy. In an age of instantaneous global communication in the hands of millions, massive casualties—including unintended civilian casualties—will
only turn international opinion against the United States. For example, highlighting civilian casualties caused by US forces in Afghanistan is one of the Taliban’s best recruiting tools.

Yet what of Clausewitz, the man supposedly responsible for inducing mass delusion in the US Army? In fact, Clausewitz seems very much an afterthought in this work. Rather than focusing on Clausewitz, Melton devotes fifty-five pages to providing short accounts of every war the United States has fought, from the Indian Wars through Operation Just Cause in 1992, even throwing in another twenty-two pages describing wars not directly involving the United States. He determines that “attrition warfare seems to be the strategy most likely to bring successful offensive wars to a successful conclusion” (31).

The accounts of these wars are more descriptive than analytical. They also contain little mention of Clausewitz. Although he writes well, Melton draws almost exclusively on textbooks or surveys, not in-depth monographs, to recount these conflicts. Some historians would argue that, because such broad surveys cannot include the nuances of more detailed treatments, the former should be avoided when writing scholarly works.

In addition to including a surfeit of material that might have been profitably omitted, Melton gives Clausewitz short shrift. Although Melton praises concepts such as war as a political instrument, fog, and friction, he excoriates Clausewitz for his “monarchical” vision and “preference for decisive, war-ending battles of annihilation.” Moreover, he argues that Clausewitz’s theories “proved disastrous for the German nation and Europe” (11–14).

Although Clausewitz’s ideas are surely not above criticism, they do deserve careful analysis before they are dismissed or blamed for the carnage of the twentieth century. Blaming Clausewitz for the bloodiness of the First World War simply repeats Liddell Hart’s interpretive mistakes.24 Blaming him for the horrors of the Second World War is quite a stretch, as well. As Hew Strachan notes, Hitler had his own take on Clausewitz. Hitler told an audience, “Not all of you have read Clausewitz, and, if you have read it you have not understood it and realized how to apply it to the future. Hitler said not turn any intellectual thread linking these conflicts. Rather, the authors focus on providing exact amounts, figures, and dates, leaving the reader a bit overwhelmed. They also discuss subjects other than war, including population growth, income inequality, urban ills, oil reserves, etc. The authors are correct in describing their work as a “screed” (x, 153).

In fact, Clausewitz discusses unconventional conflicts, at least in broad strategic terms, as well as unconventional warriors such as the Tartars. Although he offers little specific advice about how to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, he does provide useful insights into the general dynamics of unconventional wars, which, in his view, were simply a variation of war in its broadest sense.

More generally, these two books are examples—and not particularly strong ones—of two “classic” attacks on Clausewitz.28 The first treats Clausewitz as a straw man, blaming On War for a variety of failings of a contemporary military organization without bothering to determine whether those failings actually have anything to do with Clausewitz’s ideas. John Keegan’s A History of Warfare is the best known example of this kind of critique.29 Melton seems not to have read Clausewitz any more carefully than Keegan. The second kind of attack treats Clausewitz as an antique—interesting, but not applicable to the unconventional conflicts we face today. Martin van Creveld’s The Transformation of War is the best example of this genre.30

Clausewitz’s ideas, like those of anyone else, should remain open to challenge and criticism. He wrote primarily about what he knew: the large-scale conventional wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.31 As a result, air power obviously falls outside of his purview. Naval power was an important part of warfare even before Clausewitz’s time, yet it, too, finds scarce mention in On War. It is for this reason that Sir Julian Corbett wrote Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. In that work, Corbett attempted to do for
naval power what Clausewitz had done for ground warfare, drawing heavily from On War and quoting it directly.\textsuperscript{32}

Often overlooked is the fact that Clausewitz did write about revolutionary war.\textsuperscript{33} Still, most students of revolutionary war turn to Mao Tse-Tung, the most successful revolutionary ever, to learn about guerrilla warfare, because he operationalized Clausewitz's arguments about the relationship between offense and defense into a more practically applicable theory of revolutionary war.\textsuperscript{34} Although On War is, of course, dated in parts, it is nonetheless never out of date. Clausewitz created a useful theoretical explanation of war, so it matters not if he never used elements from other mediums (e.g., air and sea) or kinds of war. Clausewitz, thus, remains a key figure for any strategist because he was able to grasp the timeless elements of war, such as friction, the trinity, and the relationship between offense and defense. Both Corbett and Mao understood this point, which is why they also studied On War, perhaps more closely than the authors of the two books under review.

\textbf{NOTES}

1. I thank Nicolas Gardner and Nicholas E. Sarantakes for their invaluable help in preparing this essay.
3. The rank of major general differed in the Royal Prussian Army and in the United States. In Prussia, it was the first general rank, equal to a one-star rank in the U.S. Army.
5. Part of the mistrust also stemmed from the fact that Clausewitz resigned his commission to join the Russian Army after Prussia acquiesced to Napoleon’s demands to support his invasion of Russia in 1812. Returning to Prussia with the victorious Russian Army in 1813, he worked to turn the Prussian army and people against Napoleon. See Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” in Peter Paret, ed., \textit{Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 194–95.
7. This section on the reception of On War draws from the introduction to Strachan’s \textit{Clausewitz’s On War}. For an in-depth study that demonstrates the great influence of Clausewitz on Anglo-American military thinking, see Christopher Bassford, \textit{Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815–1945} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
8. Harry G. Summers, \textit{On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War} (New York: Presidio Press, 1982). In the book, Summers incorrectly described Clausewitz’s trinity as the government, the military and the people, which is not what Clausewitz wrote. See note 13. Despite popularizing this incorrect formulation, which has been embraced as the “triangle,” Summers was key in persuading the U.S. Army to read On War.
10. Clausewitz used the word \textit{politi}, which has been translated as either “policy” or “politics.” Although Clausewitz did not distinguish between the two, the choice of translation can alter one’s understanding of what he meant.
13. As noted in note 8, some people list the three elements of the trinity as the government, the military, and the people. Although this formulation can provide a useful way to proceed analytically, it is not what Clausewitz wrote. Yet, given the usefulness of this misreading, many people today refer to the government-military-people grouping as the “triangle.”
18. One example of this is Clausewitz’s attempt to determine what separates war in practice from war in theory. He determined that friction accounted for this difference. On paper, war proceeds as planned. On the battlefield, countless factors intervene to slow the pace of war.
19. According to the 2008 army posture statement, “‘Full-Spectrum Operations’ is the Army’s core idea about how to conduct operations on land—its operational concept. Full-spectrum operations entail the application of combat power through simultaneous and continuous combinations of four elements: offense, defense, stability, and civil support.” “Full-Spectrum Operations in Army Capstone Doctrine” (February 26, 2008), http://www.army.mil/aps/08/information_papers/transform/full_spectrum_operations.html.
21. Sir Michael Howard deemed the past an “inexhaustable storehouse of events” that could be used to “prove anything or its contrary.” Quoted in Antulio J. Echevarria II, \textit{The Trouble with History}, \textit{Parameters} (Summer 2005), 35(2), 78.
28. For the best analysis of the anti-Clausewitzian arguments and their shortcomings, see Christopher Bassford, “John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz,” \textit{War and History} 1, no. 3 (November 1994).
31. He also wrote about the Tartars and other insurgent-like forces. See, for example, Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, book 8, chapter 3.
33. Jon Sumida has recently argued that the key argument in \textit{On War} is the one Clausewitz offers about the relationship between offense and defense. Sumida contends that one of the advantages Clausewitz believed the defense possessed was its ability to resort to “peoples war” even when too weak to win a conventional battle. See Sumida, \textit{Decoding Clausewitz}.