“Total Intelligence”: New Zealand Signals Intelligence in Historical Context since 1945

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This dissertation aims to provide an historical analysis of the UK-USA Agreement and an assessment of its significance for New Zealand’s security and defence. An alliance based on the exchange and cooperation of signals intelligence, the UK-USA Agreement has established a global network of intelligence and security. The recent declassification of documents associated with the Agreement has enabled a re-examination of the alliance, allowing the opportunity for new interpretations to arise. The UK-USA Agreement is a significant alliance for New Zealand, providing the nation with numerous benefits. An analysis of the extent to which the Agreement impacted New Zealand requires an understanding, first, of the origins of the alliance – specifically the relationship between signals intelligence agencies in Great Britain and the United States and the external conditions which demanded an Anglo-American alliance. The focus then shifts to New Zealand, specifically the establishment of the national signals intelligence agency, the Government Communications Security Bureau. The significance of the UK-USA Agreement for New Zealand is assessed in the final chapter through an analysis of the benefits gained and the sacrifices made, creating a complete account of the alliance. The technological demands of the twenty first century have reinforced the necessity of the UK-USA Agreement, and this dissertation seeks to provide a historically-rooted account of the UK-USA intelligence and security community from New Zealand’s perspective.
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>America, Britain, Canada Australia</td>
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<td>ANCIB</td>
<td>Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board</td>
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<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, United States</td>
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<td>BRUSA</td>
<td>Britain-United States of America Agreement</td>
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<td>CIB</td>
<td>Combined Intelligence Bureau</td>
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<td>COIC</td>
<td>Combined Operational Intelligence Centre</td>
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<td>COMINT</td>
<td>Communications Intelligence</td>
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<td>DF</td>
<td>Direction Finding</td>
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<td>DSD</td>
<td>Defence Signals Directorate</td>
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<td>FECB</td>
<td>Far East Combined Bureau</td>
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<td>GC&amp;CS</td>
<td>Government Code and Cipher School</td>
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<td>GCHQ</td>
<td>Government Communications Headquarters</td>
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<td>GCSB</td>
<td>Government Communications Security Bureau</td>
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<td>HF</td>
<td>High Frequency</td>
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<td>IGIS</td>
<td>Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security</td>
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<td>ISC</td>
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<td>Joint Intelligence Bureau</td>
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<td>Joint Intelligence Organisation</td>
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<td>M11b</td>
<td>Code Breaking Section of Great Britain’s Army</td>
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<td>MI8</td>
<td>Cipher Bureau of Military Intelligence, United States Army</td>
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<td>RFP</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>STANCIB</td>
<td>State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board</td>
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<td>UK-USA</td>
<td>United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement</td>
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<td>USCIB</td>
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<td>W/T</td>
<td>Wireless/Telegraphy</td>
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“If you live in New Zealand, you are being watched.”
– Edward Snowden, 15 September 2014.

In the last days of the 2014 Parliamentary elections, New Zealand’s involvement with the “Five Eyes” “spying network” burst into the campaign spotlight. Journalist Glenn Greenwald, National Security Agency “whistle-blower” Edward Snowden, and WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, created a spectacle intended to inform the public of New Zealand’s involvement with the “Five Eyes,” and the controversial activities of the nation’s intelligence agency. Accusing the government of “mass surveillance” of New Zealanders, the trio failed to produce any substantial evidence, nor did they impact the election results in a noticeable manner. However, this political stunt demonstrates the topical nature of intelligence agencies and the negative connotations surrounding them. This dissertation aims to counter such reports by providing an informative account of the UK-USA Agreement, specifically related to the participation of New Zealand – the smallest and often less recognised member of the alliance. An historical analysis of the UK-USA intelligence and security community shall revise the agreement’s important provisions, assess the benefits and sacrifices of participation, and highlight the significance of the alliance for New Zealand’s security and defence.

The UK-USA intelligence and security community is a complex and structured alliance of cooperation and exchange spanning the globe. Signed in 1946, the Agreement created an initial alliance of exchange between the two Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) agencies of the United States and Britain. Later expansion of the alliance resulted in the inclusion of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, establishing

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1 “Snowden: you are being watched,” 3News, 15 September 2014, accessed via http://www.3news.co.nz/politics/snowden-you-are-being-watched-2014091518
a world-wide intelligence and security community. Despite its prominence in foreign policy and international relations, the UK-USA Agreement remained largely undocumented and unspoken about for the first fifty years of its existence. The declassification of relevant documents enables the veil of secrecy to be removed from the alliance.

The declassification of the UK-USA documents came in 2010 by the American National Security Agency (NSA) and Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). In accordance with the democratic value of transparent governmental institutions, all possible documents relevant to the alliance were made publicly available. These documents are the core of this dissertation and range from the original agreement to a series of letters and memorandums of exchange between prominent personnel. As the availability of such sources is relatively recent, they have not been available to original scholars analysing the relationship. Therefore, the release of the documents should enable the revision of any misconceptions surrounding the Agreement.

Coupled with these documents are archival sources regarding New Zealand’s participation within the alliance. Stored at Archives New Zealand, these sources include documents regarding the history of New Zealand’s first SIGINT organisation (the New Zealand Combined Signals Organisation), the nation’s own intelligence evaluation organisation (the Joint Intelligence Organisation), and correspondence between Britain and New Zealand’s defence ministries. However, documents relating to intelligence activities after 1970, specifically those of New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), are scarce. This is most likely due to the documents being too current for declassification, with potential to risk national security. Despite the lack of official documents, there are enough publicly available sources to establish a broad picture of the GCSB since its establishment.

Essentially, the UK-USA Agreement committed participating nations – Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – to the exchange, and cooperation within the field of SIGINT and all collateral information. The Agreement states the parties will exchange products from the operation of “the collection of

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traffic, acquisition of communications documents and equipment, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption and translation, acquisition of information regarding communications organisations, procedures, practices and equipment.”

Today, these are the elements that comprise the overarching field of SIGINT.

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is a broad term which refers to a wide range of technical intelligence and is the core element of the UK-USA Agreement. SIGINT is the most secretive and sophisticated form of intelligence collecting. Aiming to gain “first-hand knowledge on the adversary’s intentions, dispositions, capabilities and limitations,” SIGINT has the potential to alter the balance of world power in an instant. For the purpose of the UK-USA alliance today, SIGINT is defined as “intelligence information and technical material resulting from the interception and study of telecommunications,” specifically foreign communications. The UK-USA Agreement was originally referred to as a Communications Intelligence (COMINT) agreement. However, over the years COMINT has been divided into numerous subcategories of intelligence collection, requiring the broader term of SIGINT. When referring to the history of the Agreement, SIGINT and COMINT are used synonymously based on the context.

As SIGINT is gained from the interception of communications and surveillance, it has become a highly controversial and criticised topic. However, often misunderstood is the relevance and significance of the information provided by SIGINT, whether in times of war or peace. Today’s technologically advanced world has escalated the field for potential interception, to include both governmental and civilian communication, establishing SIGINT as one of the most comprehensive forms of security and defence.

As one of the most significant international agreements, the UK-USA Agreement has formed a global network of security and intelligence cooperation. Signed 5 March 1946 by the United States Communications Intelligence Board and the London Signal Intelligence Board, the agreement formalised previous cooperation. Further collaborating nations to the Agreement are Canada, Australia.

\footnote{British-U.S. Communications Intelligence Agreement and Outline, 5 March 1946, 3.}
\footnote{Matthew M. Aid and Cees Wiebes, “Introduction on the Importance of Signals Intelligence in the Cold War,” Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 1 (2010): 2.}
\footnote{UKUSA Comint Agreement and Appendices Thereto, 26 June 1951, 203.}
and New Zealand – each indirectly related through their allegiance to the British Commonwealth. Canada was formally involved in the original 1946 Agreement as the dominion state, which was considered “not parties to the agreement, but not third parties.” The 1948 Appendices to the agreement are the first to recognise Australia and New Zealand as collaborating Commonwealth nations, subject to their adherence to the terms of the agreement. Thus, the Agreement is a two party agreement which encompasses a further three allies.

A common misconception of the UK-USA Agreement is that it is a tiered agreement – where the United States is classed as a First Party, and Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are Second Parties. Scholars such as James Bamford, Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball have all referred to the Agreement in this way, yet they offer little evidence in support. Bamford, the first to publish on any SIGINT agency, relies on dubious sources or neglects to reference his information regarding the UK-USA Agreement. Although an expert in his field, Bamford’s only source of evidence regarding UK-USA as a tiered agreement is an interview conducted by *Ramparts* magazine with the first NSA whistle-blower, Perry Fellwock. This in depth and informative interview is nevertheless biased and subject to little cross corroboration. Scholars Richelson and Ball simply reference Bamford’s statements in their publication. However, the declassification of the UK-USA documents contradicts the statements made by Bamford. The Agreement clearly states that it is between the United States Intelligence Board and the London Signals Intelligence Board, with no dominance of either party. Thus, it is fair to conclude that although due to financial resources the United States may *act* as a dominant party, they are not technically in a superior position to Britain.

Scholarly work focused on the UK-USA Agreement emphasises the geographical distribution of areas for collection and analysis across the globe. It is

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9 Appendices to the U.S.-British Communications Agreement, 15-26 July 1948, 54.
12 Ibid., 427.
13 Richelson and Ball, 142.
14 British-U.S Communications Intelligence Agreement, 2. The signatures on the agreement, of Patrick Marr-Johnson (Colonel, British Army General Staff) and Hoyt Vandenberg (Lieutenant General, Director of U.S. Central Intelligence) are also situated adjacent to each other, indicating equal states of each party.
widely believed that each nation is allocated a geographical area for monitoring based on their own location. However, these claims, too, lack supporting evidence, being based on the investigative journalism of Duncan Campbell. The recently declassified documents do not explicitly outline this theory – likely in the interests of protecting each nation’s capabilities. The 1948 Appendices to the Agreement do, however, outline the importance of gaining “efficient cover” over the whole field of interception to avoid duplication and gain maximum coverage. More specifically, it states “in general the division of work must fall naturally according to the locations of the Direction Finding and intercept station.” Thus, although official confirmation of geographical distribution is not available, but due to efficiency and economic and resource limitations, it is likely to occur.

An important aspect of the UK-USA Agreement is the standardisation of regulations, procedures and terminology among the participating agencies. The 1951 Appendices to the Agreement provide standardised classifications, terminology, procedures, indoctrination and security matters, and layouts of information gathered. These standardised regulations apply in all UK-USA agencies and stations around the world, erasing ambiguity whilst increasing efficiency and cohesion.

The focus on security and dissemination throughout the UK-USA Agreements and its Appendices reflects the importance of SIGINT information. The 1948 Appendices state “the value of Communications Intelligence in war and peace cannot be underestimated; conservation of the source is of supreme importance.” The Agreement adds that dissemination of any information or source is always based on “the need to know” – information to only be disseminated to those requiring it to perform their duties and are appropriately “indoctrinated.” Such an emphasis on secrecy is the core of intelligence collection and analysis. Secrecy is often the invisible shield of national security, with intelligence agencies acting as the first line of

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16 Appendices to the U.S.-British Communications Agreement, 24.
17 Ibid., 25.
18 UKUSA COMINT Agreement and Appendices Thereto, 32, 97. Standardisation began through the 1943 BRUSA Agreement, and was carried through and modified through UKUSA Appendices; “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff,” War Department, 10 June 1943, Early Papers Concerning US-UK Agreement, 1940-1944, 10.
19 Appendices to the U.S.-British Communications Agreement, 13.
20 Ibid.
defence. Further, the UK-USA Agreement places importance on the secrecy of the alliance itself, stating “every effort should be made to avoid disclosure of US/UK collaboration in the COMINT field.”21 This requirement of the Agreement has resulted in a wide array of public discourse regarding the necessity of the alliance and the activities of the national SIGINT agencies. In the last two decades the veil of secrecy has slowly been removed, exposing the UK-USA Agreement to public scrutiny.

Intelligence and security is a topic shrouded in secrecy at all levels. The nature of the information has resulted in limited documentation of the organisations and activities of intelligence communities. What is available often has been revealed through investigative journalism. Initial exposure of SIGINT agencies and activities, including NSA, GCHQ and the UK-USA Agreement, came in a 1972 interview a former NSA analyst, Perry Fellwock, gave to Ramparts magazine.22 The article in a counter-cultural magazine, describes the UK-USA Agreement as a “white-anglo-saxon-protestant nation communications intelligence dictatorship.”23 This being the first public exposure of the extent of NSA’s capabilities, including SIGINT, Fellwock was deemed the original whistle-blower of the intelligence community. However, further investigative reports did not occur until British freelance journalist Duncan Campbell’s ground breaking article “The Eavesdroppers” in 1976. Campbell unveiled the role of the GCHQ during peace time and war, and its relationship with its counterpart the NSA. Although only a brief reference to the UK-USA Agreement was made, the complex environment surrounding the agreement was the focus of Campbell’s investigation.24 With little known about the UK-USA alliance at the time, Campbell’s enquiries paved the way for further investigation into the secrecy of intelligence and security communities. Over the years Campbell has continued to challenge and question the role of the GCHQ and the extent of national surveillance. Convincingly argued, Campbell’s reports laid the foundations for further questioning

21 UKUSA COMINT Agreement and Appendices Thereto, 189.
23 Ibid., 37.
regarding democratic rights and the transparency of intelligence agencies, and arguments critical of SIGINT agencies remain important and influential today.  

Campbell’s investigation informed American journalist James Bamford. Bamford exposed the inner workings of the National Security Agency to the broader public in 1982 with a detailed and analytical monograph *The Puzzle Palace: A report on America’s most secret agency*. Drawing upon sources obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, Bamford was the first to analyse and publish documents regarding the establishment, organisation and activities of the NSA. *The Puzzle Palace* takes readers back to the origins of the NSA and covers developments since. Outlining both the importance and benefits of the role of the NSA, Bamford concludes with the subtle warning of the ever expanding power the NSA could gain. “NSA’s surveillance technology will continue to expand,” he writes, “quietly pulling in more and more communications and gradually eliminating more and more privacy.” Urging an increase in statutory power over the agency, Bamford’s publication was a turning point in regards to the transparency of the NSA. Such an in-depth and comprehensive account of one of the United States’ most secret agencies proved a threat to the government, whilst highlighting further unanswered questions. In regards to the UK-USA Agreement, Bamford dedicates a whole chapter to the Anglo-American relationship. His emphasis on the background of the alliance and details of the relationship over time reflects the importance of the UK-USA Agreement throughout the NSA’s history.

Intelligence expert Richard Aldrich is the first to publish a comprehensive account of the history of the British SIGINT agency, the GCHQ. His 2010 book *GCHQ: the uncensored story of Britain’s most secret intelligence agency* provides an in-depth analysis of the GCHQ which parallels Bamford’s documentation of the NSA. However unlike Bamford, Aldrich fully supports the role SIGINT agencies play in domestic and international security. Arguing that the GCHQ is simply a reflection of the modern technological world, Aldrich notes that “the SIGINT agencies have merely been handed the impossible task of making an interconnected society perfectly secure and

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26 Bamford, 378.
risk-free, against the background of a globalised world that presents many unpredictable threats, and now has few boundaries or borders to protect us.”

The influence of technology in today’s society is much greater in comparison to 1982, when Bamford exposed the NSA. This mere fact is likely to affect the perspective of any scholar analysing intelligence and security. Drawing upon a wider array of sources than Bamford, Aldrich could have potentially improved our understanding of the UK-USA Agreement. He fails, however, to provide any new information regarding the agreement and its wider implications. Yet *GCHQ* is an important publication in the exposure and increased transparency of the world of intelligence agencies. Between *GCHQ* and *The Puzzle Palace* a comprehensive understanding emerges of the two agencies which dominate the Western world’s intelligence community.

Academic writing specifically focused on the UK-USA Agreement is scarce. The most comprehensive analysis of the UK-USA security and intelligence community is Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball’s *The Ties that Bind: Intelligence cooperation between the UKUSA countries*. Intelligence specialists representing two of the UK-USA nations, the United States and Australia, Richelson and Ball have pooled their knowledge, expertise and perspectives. In a comprehensive analysis of the agreement’s history, implications and an evaluation of the costs and risks for participating nations, Richelson and Ball have made the UK-USA agreement available for public knowledge and scrutiny. This detailed account of the UK-USA security and intelligence community is the first to focus on the agreement itself, increasing the transparency surrounding intelligence gathering, analysis and utilisation. Throughout the book, Richelson and Ball successfully argue the need for “a much firmer government oversight of the activities of the UK-USA security and intelligence agencies, and for informed public debate about these agencies and their activities.”

This argument is established through descriptions of each participating SIGINT agency combined with an examination of the agreement in operation. The authors seem to approach the subject from a neutral position. While providing an overview of each nation’s agency, they stress that the benefits and risks of intelligence

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28 Ibid., 89-107.
29 Richelson and Ball, 9.
cooperation differ from nation to nation. Such a spectrum of advantages and disadvantages creates the possibility for further insight into the UK-USA Agreement and its implications.

For New Zealand, Desmond Ball, Cliff Lord and Meredith Thatcher provide an in-depth account of the country’s SIGINT activities during World Wars One and Two in their 2011 publication *Invaluable Service: the secret history of New Zealand’s signals intelligence during two world wars.* Focusing on New Zealand’s SIGINT stations activities and contribution to the war effort, the authors create an interesting and informative book. Each chapter is dedicated to one of seven SIGINT stations, with great detail throughout. By the end of the book it is clear New Zealand’s SIGINT made a significant contribution to the Allied victory. A concluding chapter provides a brief outline of developments since 1945, suggesting areas for further research into post-war activities.

The sole individual in New Zealand working on New Zealand’s involvement with the UK-USA intelligence and security community is Nicky Hager. As an investigative journalist, Hager has analysed the organisation, operations and functions of the GCSB for a number of years. Exposing New Zealand’s role in the UK-USA community to the public, Hager has become a leading figure in the controversial debate surrounding New Zealand’s allegiances on the international stage. In his 1996 book *Secret Power: New Zealand’s role in the international spy network*, Hager analyses New Zealand’s cooperation with UK-USA nations and questions the governance of the national intelligence agency. Clearly on the left of the political spectrum, Hager argues against New Zealand’s involvement with UK-USA believing the domination of the United States has rendered New Zealand in effect a puppet state. On one hand, Hager successfully exposes numerous aspects of New Zealand’s security and intelligence community previously unknown. In doing this, he urges readers to become more “actively concerned with the activities of intelligence organisations,” calling for less secrecy surrounding these agencies. On the other hand, by neglecting any consideration of the benefits of participation with the UK-USA Agreement, Hager oversimplifies the complex realities of international alliances.

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USA community, Hager’s argument is one sided. Transparency can only go so far when defence and national security are involved. Hager acknowledges the limited democratic rights that comes with intelligence gathering, but he argues that most members of Parliament should be informed of the majority of GCSB activities.\textsuperscript{32} Yet it seems rather meaningless and possibly risky for members with no knowledge or interest in the policies of defence and security to be informed of all activities of our defence force. If the nation’s security was compromised due to the wrong person acquiring important information, the issue of transparency would look much different.

The right to speak out against one’s government is an essential right of a democratic society. Illustrating this, Hager challenges governmental policies, organisation and activities throughout his monograph. Being the first to speak out about such a secretive and controversial topic places Hager in a prominent position. The role and existence of the GCSB or SIGINT is relatively unknown by the general populace who, due to lack of information and influenced by Hager and media emphasis on spying, simply relate the two to governmental violation of privacy rights. However, the implications for the nation in not participating in the international intelligence community are often forgotten. The abundance of subjective information available taints public opinion regarding the GCSB and the agency’s involvement with the UK-USA intelligence and security community. Hager’s opinion is fair, valid and informative to the public. Yet, there is another side to the story of New Zealand’s participation with the UK-USA security and intelligence community which should be heard.

The UK-USA Agreement is a multi-lateral alliance within international relations. Foreign relations scholars argue that alliances “entail formal or informal commitments for security cooperation,” and can have a profound effect on the security of a state.\textsuperscript{33} The creation of an alliance can provide an effective form of deterrence throughout the international environment. An adversary must have resources equal to those of the alliance to pose a threat, often involves further

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 24.  
alliances, and further deters hostilities as no one nation or group of nations can gain decisive advantage.

International relations theorists and scholars have indicate that the “primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the members’ capabilities in a way that furthers their respective interests.”\textsuperscript{34} Four key approaches in alliance politics outline the conditions which make an alliance likely to endure or dissolve. First, the initial reasoning for the formation of an alliance will determine its perseverance. States will align either to enhance their power by allying with a greater power, or to counter other nations from doing the same. Alliances can be offensive or defensive – intended to provide the means for an attack, or intended as a mutual guarantee of support in the event of attack on an alliance member. A second condition determining the strength of an alliance is the calculation of comparative advantage for each ally – an evaluation of equal gain and expenditure. Third is the continuous threat of entrapment or abandonment. States often fear that an alliance will involve them in their ally’s conflicts, despite their own interests. Equally concerning is the possibility of a state not fulfilling their commitment to the alliance, resulting in the isolation and even exclusion of an ally. The final aspect of alliance theory is the adaptability of the alliance – to both the external environment and the internal interests of the member states. If the external factors which led to the alliance change, or an ally’s initial interests shift, the alliance is likely to collapse.\textsuperscript{35} Alliance politics are essential for the analysis of the UK-USA Agreement. The endurance of the agreement reflects both its significance for participating states and within international relations.

Due to New Zealand’s size and geographic isolation, the nation’s security relies, partially at least, on international agreements. Alliances with larger nations, such as Britain and the United States, provide New Zealand with defence capabilities the nation would struggle to possess on its own. Historically, New Zealand’s allegiance with the Commonwealth has provided defence and security through two World Wars. In the Cold War, membership in the SEATO and ANZUS alliances

\textsuperscript{34} Walt, 159.
provided additional security. Such defence alliances need to adapt to the developing international environment since the Cold War, an environment dictated by the capabilities of technology. Originating in the Cold War era, the UK-USA intelligence and security community has paralleled technological advancements since, broadening their sphere of security to encompass both foreign communication and cyber warfare. New Zealand’s participation with the UK-USA community is significant for national defence, providing the nation with a world class SIGINT agency, the GCSB, and four allies committed to the nation’s defence. Participation in the UK-USA Agreement has further enhanced New Zealand’s status in the international arena, reinforcing the nation as a prominent player in international affairs.

Common to multi-lateral alliances, New Zealand has sacrificed a portion of national autonomy and democratic transparency through participation with the UK-USA intelligence and security community. However, measures are consistently implemented to ensure such sacrifices are minimal and subject to external oversight. The benefits of participating in such an advanced and significant alliance outweigh the sacrifices made.

An historical analysis of the UK-USA Agreement and its implications on New Zealand will provide a comprehensive argument for the agreement’s significance and maintenance throughout this dissertation. Chapter One will review important provisions of the agreement through utilisation of recently declassified documents. Chapter Two will evaluate the implications of the agreement for New Zealand, with specific focus on the establishment of the GCSB. The concluding argument will provide an historical analysis of the UK-USA Agreement, assessing the benefits and sacrifices of participation and view the alliance through a wider scope of alliance politics. The application of theoretical conditions for alliance durability to the Agreement highlights how the alliance has endured for over sixty years, emphasising the significance of the UK-USA Agreement.

ANZUS refers to the Australia, New Zealand and United States Agreement, whilst SEATO represents the South East Asia Treaty Organisation. Walt, 158.
CHAPTER ONE:
The Alliance of Two Super-Powers

The UK-USA Agreement is one of the most significant alliances stemming from the successful relationship between the United States and Britain during World War Two. Common to alliance formation, numerous conditions contributed to the formalisation of the Anglo-American relationship and its endurance through a changing geopolitical environment. These conditions can be categorised into internal and external. The former include aspects directly related to the formation of the alliance, specifically the relationship between the United States and Britain. The latter are contextual aspects providing a wider perspective, such as the international environment. The combination of these conditions enabled a successful alliance to develop into an international network of intelligence cooperation and exchange spanning the globe for over sixty years.

Internal Conditions

The most prominent internal condition contributing to the signing of the UK-USA Agreement is the mutually beneficial intelligence relationship the United States and Britain formed during World War Two. Analysis of this requires an historical understanding of the United States National Security Agency and the British Government Communications Headquarters.

National Security Agency

The United States National Security Agency (NSA) emerged from the activities of American cryptanalysts during World War One. The United States Army established the Cipher Bureau (MI8) within the Military Intelligence Division, with Herbert Yardley appointed as director on 5 July 1917.¹ The functions of MI8 were a

product of their time, consisting of hand constructed code and cipher systems requiring the expertise of mathematicians and lexicographers. Radio intelligence was developing, and MI8 assisted radio intelligence units in the American Expeditionary Forces throughout the war.

Despite successful efforts during World War One, funding and demand for the agency diminished during the 1920s, leaving American cryptography in stagnation.\(^2\) MI8 was formally disbanded in 1929, reflecting the United States growing economic problem and low demand for intelligence units. However, intelligence services were continued through a small Signals Intelligence Service of the Army Signal Corps and the Navy’s Code and Signal Section (OP-20-G) within the Office of Naval Communications.\(^3\)

The advantages provided by intelligence and cryptology resulted in both the Army and Navy corps focusing on improving their capabilities within the field. During the inter war years, both organisations focused on the security of United States military communications, alongside the developments of radio intercept, radio direction finding and processing capabilities.\(^4\) An early division of effort was made in 1931 by the Director of Naval Communications in order to “preclude duplication of effort, to keep down to a minimum the expenditures for radio intelligence activities, and to build up a policy of whole-hearted cooperation between the radio intelligence activities of the Army and Navy.”\(^5\) Although competition between the two services remained, the demands of World War Two highlighted the importance of cooperation for effective results. This was reflected through the breaking of the Japanese diplomatic network, the “Purple” code, in 1940 – a result of successful collaboration.\(^6\) Nevertheless the lack of unity between the two agencies continued to impact decision making. The signing of a 1943 BRUSA Agreement, the precursor to the UK-USA Agreement, occurred at the peak of the hostilities between the Army

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\(^4\) Benson and Warner, 487.

\(^5\) Brownell et al., Part One, 7.

\(^6\) Ibid.
and Navy. The United States War Department signed the agreement, overriding the institutional competition.\(^7\)

One result was increased cooperation between the Army and Navy during the latter half of the war, leading to the establishment of the first high level COMINT board in 1945 – the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB).\(^8\) The first step in American intelligence unification, the ANCIB aimed to achieve broader cooperation and coordination within cryptology. However, other COMINT departments continued to practice elsewhere in the government. The Department of State was incorporated into ANCIB in December 1945, which consequently changed its name to the State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (STANCIB).\(^9\) As one of its duties, STANCIB signed the UK-USA Agreement on 5 March 1946. However, the intelligence community was growing rapidly, and STANCIB was soon forced to include both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the newly established Central Intelligence Agency in June 1947. Accordingly, STANCIB was again renamed. The new United State Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) covered all forms of SIGINT in the United States.\(^10\)

In December 1951, President Harry Truman directed the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defence to “have the communications intelligence activities of the Government surveyed, with the view of recommending any corrective measures that might be required to insure the most secure and effective conduct of such activities.”\(^11\) The Brownell Committee, chaired by prominent attorney George Brownell, undertook this task. The Brownell Committee Report was released on 13 June 1952 and changed the future of the American intelligence community. In summary, the report concluded that the activities of COMINT were of vital importance to national defence, yet the organisation of such activities seriously impeded the efficiency of operations.\(^12\) Further, the report highlighted that the present COMINT agencies duplicated operations on a regular basis, reducing efficiency and negatively affecting the security of the nation. The Committee

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\(^8\) Brownell et al., Part One, 13; Benson and Warner, 488.

\(^9\) Brownell et al., Part One, 15.

\(^10\) Ibid.

\(^11\) Brownell et al., Introduction, 1.

\(^12\) Ibid., Introduction, 4-13.
concluded that duplication resulted from inadequate authority of the USCIB over the COMINT community, compromising the Board’s ability to resolve issues. Thus, the report recommended that a “more effective centralisation of certain COMINT activities... will increase its effectiveness and correct deficiencies which have been apparent since 1949.”Following these recommendations, Truman issued National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9 on 24 October 1952, establishing the present, centralised SIGINT institution: the National Security Agency (NSA).

**Government Communications Headquarters**

The British equivalent to the NSA is currently known as the Government Communications Head Quar’s, As in the United States, British cryptology rose to prominence with the outbreak of World War One. The Army established the secret code breaking section, M11b, on 2 August 1914. M11B focused on cryptology and recognition of the discipline slowly increased throughout the war. Numerous radio intercept stations were created throughout the Commonwealth, accompanied by an increase in the number of cryptanalysts, linguists and radio traffic analysts. The majority of British intelligence focused on intercepting German radio traffic and communications during World War One. The most significant success of M11b came in 1917 with the cracking of the Zimmerman Telegram, which helped push the United States into the war. British cryptologists deciphered German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman’s telegram to the German Ambassador in Mexico, exposing Germany’s plans to offer Mexico territory of the United States if they would ally with Germany. The successful efforts of British cryptology resulted in the entry of the United States into World War One, altering the course of the war.

As with other wartime institutions, the future of British cryptology was questionable after World War One. However, the successful contribution of M11b to the war effort resulted in the United Kingdom Secret Service Committee

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13 Ibid., Introduction, 6.
recommending the creation of a unified peace time code breaking agency. The new code breaking organisation, the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS), was officially established on 1 November 1919. GC&CS initially focused on the defence of British intelligence and security, rather than on the offensive interception of foreign communications. Throughout the 1920s the GC&CS grew in personnel and resources, and over time its focus shifted to diplomatic traffic on the international stage.\(^{17}\)

Initially falling under control of the British Admiralty (Navy Fleet), the GC&CS was transferred to the Foreign Office in 1922.\(^ {18}\) This placed the organisation under the administration of the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, the SIS – the traditional foreign intelligence organisation. Such a transition of control reflects the changing focus of the organisation from domestic defence to active involvement in foreign communications.

Growing international tensions and the rising prospects of war created numerous avenues of expansion for the GC&CS during the 1930s. Closer cooperation with naval and military collection sites world-wide was of high priority, establishing both a strong defence and an offensive position for British intelligence. The significance placed on cryptology is reflected in the 1938 purchase of a possible evacuation site for the GC&CS and SIS during war. Bletchley Park, a country house in Buckinghamshire, became the symbol of British cryptology and intelligence. The GC&CS famously cracked the German Engima Machine ciphers in this period, providing the Allies with military intelligence that shaped the course of World War Two.\(^ {19}\) The importance of cryptology and SIGINT was highlighted throughout World War Two. Many believed the contributions of Bletchley Park were the deciding factor in the victory over Fascism.\(^ {20}\)

The BRUSA Agreement during war was signed by the GC&CS.\(^ {21}\) However, the British representatives who signed the UKUSA Agreement in 1946, did so on behalf of the London SIGINT Board – the supreme governing board of British SIGINT policy.\(^ {22}\)

\(^{17}\) Aldrich, 16-17.


\(^{19}\) Ibid. The Enigma Machine translated German diplomatic communication into a cipher code.

\(^{20}\) Aldrich, 55.


\(^{22}\) British-U.S Communications Intelligence Agreement and Outline, 5 March 1946.
The end of World War Two raised questions regarding the future of British SIGINT and the GC&CS. One of the most prominent figures in shaping Britain’s post war SIGINT community was Sir Edward Travis. Travis was appointed operational head of Bletchley Park in 1942, enabling him to become Director of the GC&CS in 1944. By the end of the war, GC&CS was officially known as the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) which was comprised of a small, centralised intelligence group. Travis’s structural organisation of GCHQ employed a limited number of staff who were experts in their field.\textsuperscript{23} The continuous development of British cryptology from the outbreak of World War One established a world class agency assisting in maintaining world stability through the cooperation and exchange of SIGINT.

\textit{Relations between the United States and Britain}

The UK-USA Agreement emerged from the successful relationship between the United States and Britain during World War Two. Communication between the two cryptology departments became significant in 1940. Correspondence regarding the exchange of technical information began with the formal request from the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, for the “immediate and general interchange of secret technical information,” with the United States in July 1940.\textsuperscript{24} Acting on behalf of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Lord Lothian’s diplomatic skills paved the way for a strong alliance of super-powers. Britain’s interest in cooperation with the United States was confirmed with the sending of British representatives to Washington for further discussions.\textsuperscript{25} President Franklin Roosevelt confirmed his faith in the British, informing his Chiefs of Staff to “give all information possible to the British to aid them in their present struggle, and furnish them such material assistance as will not interfere seriously with our defence preparations.”\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 61-62.
\textsuperscript{25} Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries (NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin Inc., 1985), 140.
\textsuperscript{26} “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: general interchange of secret technical information between the United States and British Government, July 19 1940,” in Early Papers Concerning US-UK Agreement, 1940-1944.
possible collaboration of British and the United States SIGINT reinforced the developing Anglo-American relationship early in the war.

Because cryptology falls under the highest secrecy and security, the exchange of secret technical information represents a milestone for Anglo-American relations. However, after cracking Germany’s Engima machine, the British decided all intelligence gathered as a result was not to be shared with the Americans until sufficient reciprocation could be provided.\(^{27}\) Complete exchange came with Churchill’s discovery of the Americans’ successful cracking of the Japanese diplomatic “Purple” code.\(^{28}\) With both nations having access to the opposition’s diplomatic code, the desire for cooperation increased markedly. As each party had something to gain and lose, proposals were drafted regarding information exchange by 1942.\(^{29}\)

Throughout negotiations, proposals were focused on the exchange and security of both the Enigma and Purple intelligence.\(^{30}\)

The United States declared war on Germany and Japan on 9 December 1941.\(^{31}\) The formal entry of the United States into the war increased the significance of SIGINT and cooperation. Existing documents suggest a gap in communication during 1941, resuming again in 1942. Though evidence for its actual existence is limited, some scholars describe the Holden Agreement, allegedly signed 2 October 1942, as the first official document to outline the exchange of technical intelligence between the United States and Britain.\(^{32}\) Whether an actual agreement existed or not, extensive communication between the two parties throughout 1942 indicates a strong and emerging Anglo American SIGINT alliance. The SIGINT relationship

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\(^{28}\) How Churchill discovered America’s success is still unknown.

\(^{29}\) Communication occurred via numerous exchanges of memos and draft proposals throughout all of 1942 and early into 1943. These are all relevant and reflect the development in cooperation, and are all sources from “Early Papers Concerning US-UK Agreement, 1940-1944.”

\(^{30}\) Ibid.

\(^{31}\) “Declaration of War with Japan, 8 December 1941” and “Declaration of War with Germany, 11 December 1941,” Untied States Senate Website, accessed via https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm

\(^{32}\) Scholars who reference the Holden Agreement cite it from Ralph Erskine, “The Holden Agreement on Naval Sigint: The First Brusa?,” Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 2 (1999). Erskine cited the United States National Archives. Scholars who have sourced Erskine include Desmond Ball, Cliff Lord, and Meredith Thatcher, Invaluable Service: The Secret History of New Zealand’s Signals Intelligence During Two World Wars (Waimauku, New Zealand: Resource Books, 2011), 65; Miriam Wharton, “The Development of Security Intelligence in New Zealand, 1945-1957,” MA, diss., (Massey University, 2012), 25. However, no official document has been able to be located.
between Britain and the United States was formalised with the signing of the 17 May 1943, BRUSA Agreement.33

Following this agreement to “exchange completely all information concerning the detection, identification and interception of signals…and the solution of codes and ciphers” the United States and Britain had established a formal SIGINT partnership.34 A successful relationship endured throughout the war, with each side praising the other’s cooperation after the war. Recognition of this first came in a letter from Rear Admiral Joseph Wenger of the United States Navy to the Director of the GC&CS, Edward Travis, dated 4 September 1945.35 Wenger states that “it is difficult to see how the teamwork of our two organisations could have been improved. I trust that our relationship will continue in the future in the same pleasant and mutually profitable way.”36 The United States Secretaries of the State, War and the Navy agreed that the relationship had been pleasant and profitable in a memorandum to President Harry Truman dated 12 September 1945. Their memorandum points directly to the success of the relationship and recommends that collaboration should continue due to the “disturbed conditions of the world and the necessity of keeping informed of technical developments and possible hostile intentions of other nations.”37 The overt reference to growing Cold War tensions invokes a factor which was beginning to dominate the majority of foreign policy decisions in the post war period. Just five days later, President Truman authorised the “continued collaboration in the field of communication intelligence between the United States Army and Navy and the British,” and stated his determination “to extend, modify, or discontinue this collaboration, as determined in the best interests of the United States.”38 The successful relationship during war indicated the benefits of a peace time collaboration of SIGINT and is a significant factor in the production of the UK-USA Agreement.

33 An Agreement between the U.S. Army and British CG and CS Concerning Cooperation in Matters Relating to Communication Intelligence, 23 June 1943.
34 Ibid.
35 Wegner was appointed Deputy Director of the National Security Agency at its establishment in 1952.
37 “Memorandum to President Harry Truman from Secretary of State, Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy,” 12 September 1945, National Security Agency: Organisation and Operations, 1945-2009, DNSA.
38 Ibid.
After months of proposals and negotiations, the original UK-USA Agreement was drafted and signed by both parties in March 1946, and it continued to be amended in the years to come. Due to previous and existing alliances, each party recognised the potential admission of Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the near future, suggesting interest in creating a world-wide SIGINT community.

A further internal condition affecting the UK-USA Agreement is the differential balance of power between the two nations in 1946. In the latter half of World War Two, Britain was in a dire state. Economically exhausted, the only hope for Allied victory was the support of the United States. Consequently, the United States entered the post-war SIGINT relationship with Britain as the world’s most powerful nation. This unequal balance of power immediately influenced Anglo-American relations.

A comparison of documents preceding the 1943 BRUSA Agreement and the 1946 UK-USA Agreement reflects this shift in power during the latter half of the war. Leading up to the BRUSA Agreement, Britain was a dominant party able to negotiate for their own advantage. In forming their proposals to the United States, Britain ensured they did not come off second best in the arrangement. A United States memorandum states that “the British have suggested informally that, if we do not agree to their proposal, they may break off entirely cooperative relations between them and ourselves in the signal intelligence field.”

The ability to force the United States to re-assess proposals and compromise reflects the firm position of the British intelligence community in 1943. However, documents of 1946 are of a different nature. The United States sees the potential to “take advantage of unique British sources,” namely the British Empire. Advisors to President Truman noted that “American technical ability in cryptanalysis is equal, if not superior, to the British,” but, “throughout the Empire [the British have] many sources of collateral information the United States does not possess.” Throughout the documents of 1946, the British appear more flexible and responsive to the American terms. The comparison of power relations between 1943 and 1946 indicates the position each nation was in

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39 “Memorandum for the Chiefs of Staff,” 12 April 1943, Early Papers Concerning US-UK Agreement.
40 “Memorandum to President Harry Truman from Secretary of State, Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy,” 12 September 1945, National Security Agency: Organisation and Operations, 1945-2009, DNSA.
41 Ibid.
after the war. Britain focused on recovery, while the United States emerged as a victorious world super power. Nevertheless, the signing of UK-USA proved beneficial in the short and long term for both parties.

The UK-USA Agreement provided both nations with immediate benefits. Britain gained security and a prosperous looking future for their most successful war time agency. On the other hand, the United States appeared to be looking towards the future and growing Cold War tensions. The Cold War might be considered essentially an American war to sustain world superiority, a war which was dominated by all forms of intelligence. The UK-USA Agreement provided the United States with an extremely competent ally, in all forms of defence, for their Cold War dispute against the Soviet Union. The Commonwealth alliances Britain maintained also offered geopolitical advantages for the United States. Aligning with the British Commonwealth meant in-direct alliances with nations such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Dispersed around the globe, the United States gained numerous geographically strategic allies.

Despite the large power disparity between the two nations in 1946, both parties remained of equal stature in every provision of the UK-USA Agreement. Each party benefitted at the time and continues to do so today from the cooperation of SIGINT agencies. Nevertheless, recognition of the power disparity is important for a complete understanding of the Anglo American relationship at the time of the UK-USA Agreement.

**External Conditions**

The international environment of the 1940s is the most significant external condition contributing to the Anglo-American SIGINT alliance. Technological demands of World War Two, including necessary measures of counter espionage and increased enemy SIGINT capabilities, required Allied cooperation for the creation of a strong intelligence community. From the beginning of the war each nation employed every form of intelligence gathering they could. Allied cooperation began in 1940 and was a significant factor in the defeat of the Axis powers. Diplomatic codes of both Germany and Japan were intercepted, enabling both defensive and offensive
preparations. Despite the British having cracked the Enigma code, Axis powers continued making technical advances throughout the war requiring continued counter intelligence measures by the Allies. The fight against Fascism resulted in the formal alliance of the United States and Britain with the BRUSA Agreement, which was maintained in the post war environment.

The international environment of the post war era contributed to the urgency for completing formalisation of cooperation between the United States and Britain. The threat of Fascism was suddenly replaced with the threatening spread of Communism, and Cold War tensions were growing by the late 1940s. In 1950, the British Chiefs of Staff expressed their belief that “the British Commonwealth and the Continental Powers, whether individually or collectively, cannot fight Russia except in alliance with the United States: nor could the United States fight Russia without the help of the British Commonwealth.” From the beginning of the Cold War, Allied defence policy was fundamentally based upon multi-national cooperation and coordination.

To meet the demands of the Cold War, SIGINT agencies shifted focus towards the Soviet Union, interested not only in their political activities but their scientific and nuclear warfare advancements. A great emphasis was placed on intercepting Soviet diplomatic traffic, a secret project famously codenamed “Venona.” The capabilities of SIGINT assisted in the monitoring and exposing of atomic spies or Russian moles throughout the United States government. The Soviets possessed similar capabilities. Thus SIGINT, helped ensure the Cold War did not turn into a hot war, keeping each side aware of the others destructive capabilities.

Additional Agreements Relevant to the UK-USA Agreement

The UK-USA Agreement is only one aspect of cooperation in a sphere of defence and military alliances between New Zealand and other states. Further alliances both compliment and reinforce each other, covering different avenues of

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43 Benson and Warner. Venona provided the United States with thousands of documents throughout its operations, resulting in the exposure and conviction of numerous Russian agents in both the Government and Civil Service sector.
mutual interests. Although numerous alliances exist among the UK-USA participating states, there are three of high relevance for New Zealand.

The ANZUS Treaty of 1951 established a tripartite alliance among Australia, New Zealand and the United States. The partnership grew out of a mutual desire for peace and stability throughout the Pacific, which depended on the future of Japan in the post-war world.\textsuperscript{44} Provisions of the United States peace treaty with Japan permitted a degree of rearmament, a factor which Australia and New Zealand believed threatened the security of the Pacific. To counter Allied fears, the United States provided their assurance of military support to Australia and New Zealand, and vice versa, in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{45} Each nation was to perceive that “an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety.”\textsuperscript{46} However, the strategic link was severed after New Zealand’s prohibition of nuclear war ships from entering its waters in 1985. Responding to this, the United States terminated all military and intelligence ties with New Zealand from February 1985.\textsuperscript{47} Despite this, ANZUS has been viewed as one of New Zealand’s most significant defence treaties, providing security throughout the Pacific. ANZUS and the UK-USA Agreement have supplemented each other since their inception, formalising the defence and security relationship between the United States and New Zealand.

The importance of stability and security of the Asia-Pacific region for the United States and New Zealand’s role in it was further reflected in the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) of 1954. SEATO focused on the collective defence of the region through the containment of communist forces. The United States, France, Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan all committed to the defence organisation which aimed to strengthen economic and living standards throughout South East Asia. However, the organisation had no military forces as a collective and called only for the consultation of nations leaving each state to react

individually to internal threats. SEATO was formally disbanded in 1977 after the most prominent reason for existence, the protection of South Vietnam, ceased to be relevant in 1975. Still SEATO represents the growing cooperation of the United States, Britain and New Zealand, as it formalised another defence and security alliance among the nations.

The American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies Programme is a coalition of the five armies of the UK-USA Agreement. ABCA nations seek to “cooperate where possible to share information to achieve operational compatibility and to obtain the maximum economy by use of the combined resources and efforts” of the UK-USA armies. Originating in 1947 as a tripartite organisation of the United States, Britain and Canada, the coalition expanded to include Australia in 1963. New Zealand was granted observer status in 1965, and later gained official inclusion in 2006. ABCA works to ensure standardisation and cooperation throughout the five armies. Although not directly linked to the UK-USA Agreement, the organisation provides a further field of commitment among the five nations.

Additional alliances such as ANZUS, SEATO and ABCA all supplement New Zealand’s participation within the UK-USA intelligence and security community. Sufficient contribution to such alliances requires New Zealand to have specific capabilities and resources. In regards to the UK-USA Agreement, New Zealand’s SIGINT capabilities improved drastically since participation within the intelligence and security community.

New Zealand’s SIGINT Origins

As the UK-USA Agreement is primarily an agreement between the United States and Britain, historians have tended to focus analysis of the Agreement on the two nations. However, other nations were also involved in the SIGINT activities sanctioned by the UK-USA Agreement. Despite being the smallest member, New Zealand has become a key player within the UK-USA community. The nation’s SIGINT

49 Richelson and Ball, 155.
capabilities have improved drastically through the direct assistance of Britain and the United States.

New Zealand’s SIGINT capabilities began on a much smaller level than in either Britain or the United States. At the turn of the twentieth century, New Zealand and Australia were exploring the advantages of wireless technology for long distance radio communication. Used for communication across the Tasman Sea, it soon became apparent this technology could be utilised for maritime safety and as a communication link in Britain’s Imperial chain. New Zealand established five “marine radio coast stations” across the country in 1909 aimed at providing “point-to-point radio telegraphy services with other stations in the Imperial Chain.”

Connections with Australia and Suva in Fiji, Britain’s radio connection point with the United States, were of high importance, alongside communications with ships at sea. New Zealand’s radio communication stations were under the administration of Australia until 1929 when it became clear New Zealand could oversee the running of such stations itself.

At the outbreak of World War One, New Zealand radio stations were called upon to serve the Commonwealth. Under the direction of the Post and Telegraph Department, New Zealand was assigned the monitoring and interception of German radio traffic, both diplomatic and naval. In their history of New Zealand SIGINT in World Wars One and Two, Ball, Lord and Thatcher detail numerous contributions made by the New Zealand teams, assisting the British to maintain security of the Pacific. New Zealand’s intercept stations provided material for larger cryptanalysis stations in London, Melbourne and Singapore to decipher, whilst monitoring the transmissions of Japanese submarine activity and German naval movements throughout the Pacific.

The interwar period saw large developments in New Zealand’s radio communications abilities. The established capabilities of New Zealand’s Post and Telegraph Department, specifically the radio coast stations in Awarua (Bluff), Auckland and Wellington, were prominent enough to be utilised for defence purposes. In 1934, Britain had expanded their naval and military intelligence against

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51 Ball, Lord, and Thatcher, 2-3. These stations were in Auckland, Wellington, Awanui (Northland), Awarua (Southland), and the Chatham Islands.
52 Ibid, 13, 6-7, 307-309.
Japan, establishing an outstation for the GC&CS in Singapore to monitor the Far East – known as the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB). The FECB oversaw intelligence collection and established co-ordination of signals interception in the Far East, incorporating employees of the eighteen Commonwealth wireless intercept stations from around the Pacific. By 1936, the British Admiralty had plans for the installation of new High Frequency (HF), Direction Finding (DF) stations throughout the New Zealand, incorporating the nation into the FECB. HF DF stations provide the bearings for the approximate positioning of a naval vessel, essentially identifying the enemy’s location. The New Zealand Government approved the establishment of SIGINT capabilities in 1938 (known as signals interception or “Y” section), with interceptions of Soviet naval communications beginning not long after. SIGINT stations were initially installed at the Auckland and Awarua stations in 1939, providing New Zealand with its first highly technical form of SIGINT capabilities. The majority of New Zealand’s SIGINT tasks were undertaken on behalf of the FECB, under the direction of the British Admiralty. New Zealand radio officers were both posted and trained at the FECB, which also provided guidance and technical assistance to the New Zealand stations when needed. Overall, strong Commonwealth SIGINT collaboration existed.

The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) undertook most of the nation’s SIGINT operations during World War Two. Primarily becoming an extension of SIGINT activities in Singapore and Melbourne, New Zealand naval staff focused their attention on the interception of German, Russian and Japanese naval signals. Domestically, the Post and Telegraph Department oversaw radio communications, providing the facilities, equipment and personnel. The Navy Office, the administration branch of the RNZN since 1921, established the Central War Room and the Combined Intelligence Bureau (CIB) in 1940. The RNZN operated a Merchant Shipping Section and an Intelligence Section. The former relied on DF services, working to identify naval vessel locations, whilst the latter was “responsible for all

54 Ball, Lord and Thatcher, 14-17, 26.
55 Ibid., 35.
intelligence, both Pacific and internal.” The Intelligence Section corresponded largely with the Police Department and the Security Intelligence Bureau regarding domestic intelligence and security matters. October 1941 saw the CIB renamed to become the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre (COIC), a name which better reflected its task of providing operational intelligence for the Chiefs of Staff. The COIC was a combined organisation responsible to all three defence services and provided intelligence on enemy and friendly forces, especially Japan and the Pacific.

From the beginning of the Second World War, New Zealand directly sent all DF bearings to Australia and the FECB. With entry of the United States into the war in December 1941, New Zealand expanded its SIGINT capabilities. Hostilities in the Pacific demanded that New Zealand undertake its own SIGINT operations, as well as contribute directly to the networks of the United States. Correspondence between New Zealand and the United States was forbidden by Britain until both the Singapore and Corregidor (the United States’ Naval interception and cryptanalytic station in the Philippines) stations fell to the Japanese in the early months of 1942. Control of Allied SIGINT operations in the Pacific was given to Melbourne, whilst New Zealand gained increased responsibilities and assistance from the United States.

Commanders of the British Royal Navy displayed confidence in New Zealand in 1942 when they decided to install “radio finger printing” (RFP) or “Z” intelligence facilities in the country. RFP provides the exact identification of a radio transmitter through its unique “fingerprint” that characterises its transmissions, essentially what kind of wireless device is functioning. The Rapaura station, near Blenheim, began to monitor and identify the sources of Japanese Naval signals in 1942. Combined with DF intelligence, RFP was of immense importance, identifying the location and specific radio sets assigned to particular vessels. A smaller RFP unit was also situated in the Wellington Navy Office, but its contributions were not as significant as Rapaura.

56 Ibid., 55.
57 Tonkin-Cowell, 59, 67.
58 Ibid., 64.
59 Ball, Lord and Thatcher, 231-232.
60 Ibid., 231.
Throughout the war, New Zealand operated nine SIGINT stations, covering both radio interception, DF intelligence and RFP. These stations were located at Waipapakauri (Northland), Musick Point (Auckland), Waiouru, Palmerston North, Wellington, Nelson, Rapaura (Blenheim), Awarua (Southland) and Suva (Fiji).  

After war ended in 1945, interception and DF activities in New Zealand declined. The Pacific was viewed as relatively stable, and the New Zealand stations which remained operational focused on domestic maritime radio communications. A small amount of radio interception activity is likely to have occurred at the NR2 Naval Receiving Station located at Waiouru, which became New Zealand’s principle SIGINT station from 1948.

The reorganisation of Commonwealth and Allied SIGINT Organisations after the war dictated future developments of New Zealand SIGINT operations. A small number of individuals maintained the administration of SIGINT activities between 1944 and 1949, which saw New Zealand’s official SIGINT base, HMNZS Irirangi, begin operations. As during the war, New Zealand’s post war SIGINT organisation and operations were aligned with the wishes of both the British Commonwealth and the United States. The inclusion of New Zealand and other nations in the 1948 Amendments of the UK-USA Agreement formalised the alliance and shaped the future of the New Zealand intelligence community.

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61 Ibid., xvii.
62 Ibid., 231-232, xvii, 319.
CHAPTER TWO:
New Zealand in the UK-USA Community

Since World War Two, New Zealand’s Commonwealth allegiances have structured the nation’s security and defence policies, having significant implications for its intelligence community. Ultimately, commitments to the policies of the UK-USA Agreement have provided New Zealand security and stability in an era of increasing technological warfare. Since the signing of the Agreement, New Zealand’s SIGINT abilities have developed in a significant manner due to the assistance of UK-USA nations. Establishing an independent SIGINT agency in 1977, the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), New Zealand became a prominent player in the international arena and the growing intelligence and security network.

Aligning with the Commonwealth

New Zealand’s Commonwealth alliances were further reinforced during post war defence and security planning. A prominent participant at the May 1946 British Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, New Zealand committed itself to the continuation of defence policies structured parallel to Britain’s.¹ The first of Britain’s proposals was the formation of a Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) within New Zealand, whose function would be to “collate, evaluate and distribute factual intelligence.”² The New Zealand JIO would parallel, and contribute to, the activities of its counterparts in London and Melbourne, reinforcing the nation’s involvement with the Commonwealth intelligence community. Officially approved by Cabinet 23 February 1949, the JIO was placed under administration of the Prime Minister’s Department but was expected to maintain cohesion with the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff for defence services, who would communicate with London and Melbourne.³

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² Chiefs of Staff Committee - Joint Intelligence Organisation in New Zealand, 24 May 1948, Intelligence – New Zealand Joint Intelligence Bureau, R 23 447 132, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
³ Minister of Defence Recommendation, 23 February 1949 and Memorandum from the Prime Ministers Department, 3 May 1949, Intelligence – New Zealand Joint Intelligence Bureau.
The role of the JIO was not to collect intelligence, which was the responsibility of the individual services, but to analyse such intelligence to determine its relevance for the British Commonwealth’s defence policy. Producing surveys and reports regarding New Zealand, Fiji and “other islands in immediate strategic interest” to the Pacific, the JIO formally established another link in the Commonwealth intelligence community. Britain also wanted New Zealand to maintain complete cooperation and communication with the Melbourne Joint Intelligence Bureau. From the Commonwealth viewpoint, “it was highly desirable that the New Zealand organisation should collaborate fully with the Melbourne Bureau, and in effect operate as a collecting post for that office.” Cohesion between Melbourne and New Zealand was emphasised throughout correspondence regarding the organisation of the JIO, reflecting the underlying will to develop a global intelligence network.

Meanwhile, as New Zealand’s participation with the Commonwealth’s intelligence network increased, the nation looked towards more direct military support from another super-power – the United States. The role of Britain as a “powerful friend and defence mentor” for New Zealand slowly declined during World War Two, allowing the rise of the United States as a security guarantor in the Pacific. The ANZUS Treaty formalised defence support and alliance with the United States, connecting New Zealand to both primary signatories of the UK-USA Agreement.

British influence over New Zealand’s intelligence community continued despite Britain’s exclusion from ANZUS. In 1952, New Zealand sought approval from the Chiefs of Staff (Britain) to change the name of the JIO to the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), reinforcing consistency with the London and Melbourne Joint Intelligence Bureaus. Approval was given in early 1953 and was effective from 1 March. The establishment of New Zealand’s JIB was a product of the British intelligence community, structured and organised to parallel other Commonwealth JIBs. Reflecting the intentions of Britain and the future security interests of the

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4 Joint Intelligence in New Zealand - A Report by the Joint Planning Committee, 9 March 1949, Intelligence – New Zealand Joint Intelligence Bureau.
5 Notes of Discussions between Major-General K.W.D Strong and the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 15 March 1949, Intelligence – New Zealand Joint Intelligence Bureau.
7 Joint Intelligence Office – Change of Name, 4 July 1952, Intelligence – New Zealand Joint Intelligence Bureau.
8 Joint Intelligence Office – Change of Name, Intelligence – New Zealand Joint Intelligence Bureau.
Commonwealth, the establishment of the JIB (originally the JIO) was the first direct result from the 1946 UK-USA Agreement for New Zealand. The JIB of New Zealand was a product of the British wish for SIGINT cooperation and coordination within the Commonwealth and wider UK-USA community. The emphasis Britain placed on Commonwealth intelligence cohesion is reflected through the Director of London’s JIB, Major-General Strong’s statement: “JIB (London) is a direct result of the lessons learnt during the war when it was discovered that total war required total intelligence.”

During these discussions, Major-General Strong was highlighting the necessity of a New Zealand JIB, emphasising the growing Cold War tensions and the possibility of another “total war.” Representing New Zealand’s first formal link in the developing global intelligence network, the creation of the JIB was a taste of the future for New Zealand’s intelligence community.

The New Zealand JIB collated, evaluated and distributed intelligence collected by the individual defence services, whose collection activities had diminished to a small office monitoring maritime activities in the Pacific at the Waiouru Naval Receiving Station, NR2, after World War Two. Post war developments within New Zealand’s defence forces paralleled events connected to the UK-USA Agreement. In January 1947, New Zealand’s Navy Department purchased the former SIGINT site of the Royal New Zealand Air Force located in Waiouru. The Navy Department planned to construct a new radio interception station, called NR1, commencing operations in 1949. NR1 was commissioned HMNZS *Irirangi*, in late 1951 and replaced NR2 as the headquarters of New Zealand’s SIGINT for three decades.

Maintaining the coherence aimed for by the UK-USA Agreement, NR1 was in frequent correspondence with Australia’s SIGINT organisation, Defence Signals Directorate (DSD). By January 1954, New Zealand radio operators were being sent for three months of training in Melbourne to familiarise them with the standardised structure, techniques and operations of the UK-USA community.

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9 Minutes of Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee held on Monday 20 January at 3pm, 20 January 1949, Intelligence – New Zealand Joint Intelligence Bureau.

10 The station was believed to be commissioned on 30 October 1951, although the only source is: Desmond Ball, Cliff Lord, Meredith Thatcher, *Invaluable Service: the secret history of New Zealand’s signals intelligence during two world wars* (Waimauku, New Zealand: Resource Books, 2011, 320. It is unknown why HMNZS *Irirangi* is named similar to a ship. *Irirangi* translates to “radio” in English so it can be assumed that HMNZS *Irirangi* was selected to maintain coherence with other RNZN stations.

Zealand Minister of Defence for the formation of the New Zealand Combined Signals Organisation (NZCSO) was given on 15 February 1955, formalising New Zealand’s collaboration with the UK-USA intelligence and security community.12

The NZCSO was New Zealand’s first official SIGINT organisation and Britain had a fundamental impact on its establishment and development. A British officer was placed on service in New Zealand to assist with the creation of the new organisation, which effectively replaced the work undertaken by operators stationed at HMNZS *Irirangi*. Following British wishes, the NZCSO was organised “along the lines of the Admiralty Civilian Shore Wireless Service in the United Kingdom and forms part of a Commonwealth-wide network.”13 Staff of NZCSO were trained in Melbourne, Singapore and London to ensure the exchange of personnel between UK-USA stations was efficient and successful.14 In August 1955 the NZCSO recommended that Assistant Station Radio Officer, J.A. Timlin, be exchanged with his British counterpart, L.G. Robb for the period of two years. It was expected that on return to New Zealand, Timlin would take over as Station Radio Officer of NZCSO.15 Such exchange of personnel was common to ensure continuity and a sense of community throughout the participating UK-USA nations.

The NZCSO was responsible for all New Zealand SIGINT as well as the maintenance of the Waiouru Naval W/T (Wireless/Telegraph) Station, HMNZS *Irirangi*. In 1960, the NZCSO had twenty-nine officers serving in New Zealand and thirteen overseas.16 Both the Royal New Zealand Navy and the Army maintained units at Waiouru, contributing to the work of NZCSO radio intercept operators.17 Further, the NZCSO oversaw New Zealand’s role as a collection site for Melbourne’s DSD, dictating what the nation focused on – mostly activities in the Pacific, Far East Asia and Antarctica.18 In accordance with commitments to the UK-USA community, the NZCSO committed to training and posting of personnel overseas, mainly to Melbourne, Singapore or London. Distribution of SIGINT reports to the Chiefs of Staff

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14 Establishment of New Zealand Combined Signals Organisation, NZCSO: General.
15 Memo from NZNB to RNZLO London, 4 August 1955, NZCSO: General.
17 Ball, Lord, and Thatcher, 320.
of all participating nations was undertaken by the NZCSO Distribution Office, located in Wellington, which was in continuous contact with the domestic intercept stations.\textsuperscript{19}

The NZCSO was a direct result of the UK-USA Agreement for New Zealand. New Zealand gained a well-structured, resourced and financed organisation to provide international security. Becoming a formal organisation and participant in the UK-USA intelligence network required advances in organisation, structure and ability over previous SIGINT operations. The majority of these advances received important assistance from Britain and Australia. Training from the most established SIGINT organisations in the world provides New Zealand with extremely capable personnel, a quality essential for any governmental organisation. Numerous visits from British officials occurred following the formation of the NZCSO, reflecting the commitment Britain had to maintaining exceptional standards and capabilities in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{The Government Communications Security Bureau}

Reinforcing its commitment to the UK-USA Agreement, the NZCSO officially expanded to become the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), the present SIGINT organisation of New Zealand, in April 1977.\textsuperscript{21} The GCSB has two main functions: information assurance (protection against cyber-attacks) and to obtain foreign SIGINT. In regards to the UK-USA Agreement, the GCSB’s role of obtaining foreign SIGINT is the main focus.

Due to the nature of the intelligence and security community, public access to documents regarding the NZCSO and the GCSB between 1960 and the late 1970s are scarce. Further information began to arise after the disclosure of New Zealand’s SIGINT community in the 1980s, stimulating public and parliamentary discussions. Official documentation regarding the establishment, structure, or activities of the GCSB are still classified by the Ministry of Defence. However, the two SIGINT collection stations currently operated by the GCSB are publicly known – the radio

\textsuperscript{19} Ball, Lord, and Thatcher, 320.
\textsuperscript{20} NZCSO: General.
interception and DF station at Tangimoana (operations began 1982) and the satellite communications interception station at Waihopai, near Blenheim (operations began 1989). The existence of the GCSB was disclosed on 16 July 1980 in a New Zealand Public Service Official Circular. However, any functions or activities of the organisation were placed on a strict need to know basis for a further four years.

The functions of the GCSB were officially exposed to the House of Representatives on 15 August 1980 after questioning amongst members. Hon. David Thomson, Leader of the House of Representatives, announced that:

> Following the recommendations of the ombudsman’s report on the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, the Government Communications Security Bureau has been set up with the functions of establishing and monitoring national communications and technical security standards.

Thomson continued to reveal that the GCSB employed twenty-two staff at an estimated annual cost of $400,000. The three year period between the GCSB’s establishment and the formal acknowledgement of its existence has resulted in uncertainty towards the agency. Such a lack of transparency regarding the establishment of a governmental institution naturally stimulates questions regarding the agency itself, and the Government responsible. A majority of the New Zealand public are likely to be ignorant to the nation’s SIGINT history and its significance. Only recently has the current role of the GCSB become publically recognised. However, limited information has resulted in a misinformed general population, often drawing negative conclusions of the GCSB and the UK-USA alliance due to such a lack of information.

The most prominent acknowledgement of the GCSB and its contributions on the international stage came in 1984 through a Ministerial Statement issued by then Prime Minister Robert Muldoon. Beginning with an overview of the functions of the Bureau, Muldoon justified the necessity of the institution he established:

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22 Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries* (NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin Inc., 1985), 76. Availability of the initial primary source has been scarce. However, its relevance is limited.

23 Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 15 August 1980, 2774.

24 Ibid.
Through the Government Communications Security Bureau, and, before it, the Combined Signals Organisation, New Zealand has collected that form of intelligence [signals] from the time of the Second World War. New Zealand, along with most nations, places great emphasis on having the widest possible source of intelligence on which to base its defence and other international policies. The foreign intelligence collection function of the Government Communications Security Bureau is, therefore, of major importance and of significant value to New Zealand. Successive Governments have endorsed the importance of such activities. Because of the technical nature of that intelligence function New Zealand, through the Government Communications Security Bureau, liaises closely with its allies – Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The New Zealand organisation is under full control of the New Zealand Government.25

Muldoon’s revelation came at a controversial time for New Zealand international relations. Coincidentally, and possibly the catalyst for Muldoon’s announcement, the Labour Party had just disclosed their new unconditional nuclear free foreign policy. Helping David Lange and the Labour Party win the election, the nuclear free policy was tested in February 1985. The request from the United States for the visit of the ageing destroyed USS Buchanan to New Zealand was denied by the government due to suspicions of its nuclear armament. Consequently, the United States severed all military and intelligence ties with New Zealand from February 1985.26 Undermining the cooperation instilled by the ANZUS Treaty, New Zealand’s nuclear free policy caused a significant disagreement between the nations.

The loss of United States cooperation had notable effects on the New Zealand intelligence community, reflecting the implications participation in the UK-USA community has for New Zealand. A GCSB Annual Report covering the period of 1985-1986 clearly expresses the reliance New Zealand had on its UK-USA partners. After 1985, the distribution of United States SIGINT to New Zealand was reduced. Partners within the UK-USA community were also asked by the NSA to exclude all United States content from any material provided to New Zealand. The GCSB was excluded from the Allied Far East SIGINT Conference and it was acknowledged by the GCSB

that in the event of New Zealand losing all United States collection assistance, a heavy burden would fall on the agency’s collection facilities – a burden which could not be sustained.\textsuperscript{27}

The strict termination of the ANZUS alliance with New Zealand can be seen as an example of the United States asserting their status as a dominant world power. By the 1980s, American allies were beginning to show concern about the nation’s global nuclear policy. New Zealand’s stance against the super-power had the potential to inspire further American allies to place their nuclear policies above those of the United States. This in turn would decrease the United States’ world influence, and the USSR would likely gain power.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, a harsh reaction towards New Zealand provided an efficient example of the lengths the United States would go, without having any significant impact on its own interests. The United States occupied no strategic facilities in New Zealand that it could lose, and any SIGINT information that arose from Tangimoana was to be shared with Britain and indirectly, the United States. Therefore, the harsh reaction of the Reagan administration significantly impacted New Zealand’s defence and security, whilst increasing the influence the super-power had in the international arena.

The GCSB Annual Report of 1985-1986 is the earliest indication available of the impact both participation in the UK-USA community, and the consequences of the ANZUS dispute, had on the GCSB itself. Expenditure of the Bureau rose from $7.5million in 1984 to an estimated $13.2million in 1987.\textsuperscript{29} The increase can be further compared with the $400,000 announced in 1980.\textsuperscript{30} Until Waihopai opened in 1989, the GCSB only had one operating SIGINT station – Tangimoana. Thus, the increase in expenditure is indicative of the growing activity at Tangimoana, most likely due to the loss of the support from the United States. Further, personnel employed by the GCSB rose from 5,693 in 1984 to 6,813 in 1985. Tangimoana intercepted 165,174 messages from French, Vietnamese, North Korean, Egyptian, Argentine and Soviet targets throughout the 1985-1986 period.\textsuperscript{31} These intercepts

\textsuperscript{28} Mack, 464-466.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 15 August 1980, 2774.
would have been in both the interests of New Zealand and its UK-USA partners, most likely dominated by Cold War interests. The early 1980s saw the Cold War intensify after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and the level of tension had not been seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The increase in GCSB activity during this phase is indicative of New Zealand’s support role in the international arena.

Significant legislative oversight of New Zealand’s intelligence community occurred in 1996. The “Intelligence and Security Committee Act 1996” increased the level of oversight for the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) and the GCSB. The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), established by the Act, is the primary oversight mechanism for the agencies. It consists of the Prime Minister, two members of Parliament nominated by the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and one Member of Parliament nominated by the Leader of the Opposition. Actions of the GCSB are all subject to the ISC, which aims to ensure the intelligence process is as democratic and transparent as possible.\(^{32}\) Another level of oversight implemented was the “New Zealand Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence Act 1996.” The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) is appointed by the Governor-General on recommendations from the Prime Minister and provides an “independent external oversight and review of the intelligence and security agencies.”\(^{33}\) The IGIS aims to ensure each agency acts in compliance with the law and that any complaints relating to intelligence and security are independently investigated. To fulfil this role, the IGIS is authorised to view any material of the agencies.\(^{34}\)

Official documentation of the GCSB and its activities is scarce during the period 1980s – 2000s. Due to the nature of security and intelligence, the GCSB rarely releases official information as it involves aspects of national security and defence. One source of information derives from investigative journalism. This can have both positive and negative implications for public knowledge. On one hand, journalists

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commit themselves to reporting events through an objective lens, enabling the public to establish their own opinions. Nevertheless, reports of the GCSB are often biased against the agency, tainting the public’s opinion and knowledge of the bureau. Information is obtained through investigative reporting, with no authoritative or official insight. Reporting on the GCSB, moreover, typically emphasises words such as “spies,” “secret global network,” or “dominated by the United States.” When the only public source of information comes from such reporting it seems only natural the agency is commonly aligned with critical connotations. Further, such a lack of information results in a public who do not understand the necessity of intelligence agencies.

Still, in the absence of other sources, journalistic accounts can fill the gap, when viewed critically. After the revelation of the operation Tangimoana station in 1984, information slowly became available regarding the functions and resources of the agency. Defence and security analyst Jim Rolfe reported in 1997 that the satellite communications interception station, Waihopai, was monitoring seven communications satellites at its opening in 1989. This number rose to fifteen by 1994, and was expected to rise to twenty-three by 2000. Waihopai was believed to be monitoring activities in the Pacific, South East Asia, Japan, South America and parts of Antarctica. Rolfe’s article was informative yet raised questions of the GCSB’s growing surveillance capabilities of the Pacific region and its citizens.

The most comprehensive report available on the GCSB, Secret Power, was published by investigative journalist Nicky Hager in 1996. Although Hager provides much detail unavailable elsewhere, his book is more of an opinion piece than investigative journalism. Information is often presented in a biased manner, with the opposing argument commonly neglected. Further, it is rare for Hager to reference an official governmental source. The book is a reflection of his strongly held opinion.

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38 Nicky Hager, Secret Power: New Zealand’s Role in the International Spy Network (Nelson, NZ: Craig Potton Publishing, 1996). Hager has released a more recent publication, Other People’s Wars, mentioning the GCSB yet with no significantly new information.
critical of the GCSB and New Zealand’s involvement in the UK-USA intelligence and security community. Although his critical perspective provides an analytic view, Hager fails to consider any possible benefits participation within the UK-USA Agreement provides for New Zealand.\textsuperscript{39}

Hager’s assessment of the GCSB resulted in an “Inquiry into the National Control of SIGINT Collection and Reporting by the GCSB,” on request from Prime Minister Jenny Shipley in 1998. Undertaken by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Laurie Greig, the request was a response to:

Public allegations to the effect that the operations of the GCSB ... are insufficiently subject to New Zealand’s national control, but are instead operating primarily for the benefit (and even at the direction) of our international intelligence partners.\textsuperscript{40}

The focus of the request was “the compliance by the GCSB with the law of New Zealand and the propriety of its activities.”\textsuperscript{41} The inquiry assessed activities undertaken by the agency and the extent to which these are undertaken primarily for the benefit of international partners. Greig concluded that the benefits gained from international cooperation justifies the portion of sovereignty sacrificed and that the GCSB is “not managed, controlled or influenced by USA or other of its intelligence partners contrary to our own national interests.” The report further acknowledged that:

The cooperation between the GCSB and its intelligence partners, both in its procedures and operations, adequately protects the privacy interests of New Zealand persons and entities and is beneficial to New Zealand’s national and international interests.\textsuperscript{42}

The inquiry into the national control of the GCSB reflects the Government’s active response to public allegations and the democratic oversight to which the agency

\textsuperscript{39} Michael Herman, \textit{Intelligence services in the information age: theory and politics} (London: Taylor and Francis, 2001), 150-152.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 5.
is subject. Following this report came the “Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003,” providing parliamentary oversight to the agency.  

Annual reports of the GCSB’s activities, finances and performance reviews became publicly available in 2003. The reports provide an overview of the agency since 2003, although there appears to be a significant amount of generalisation and repetition over the years. Through analysis of the Annual Reports, it becomes clear that the main focuses of the GCSB in the period 2003-2013 included: counter-terrorism; regional security; supports to deployed New Zealand Defence Force services; and “maintenance and enhancement of its membership of the international intelligence and security community.” The annual expenditure of the GCSB has risen from $29,154,000 in 2003 to $73,409,000 in 2013 (a two hundred and fifty percent rise) due to technical developments, services and increasing personnel. The disclosure of these reports provides reliable information of the agency, increasing transparency and the possibility of an informed public.

In more recent years, the activities of the GCSB and the agency’s compliance with the GCSB Act 2003 have been under scrutiny. In 2012, the GCSB was accused of unlawfully intercepting the communications of an individual residing in New Zealand, calling all activities and operations of the agency into question. As a result, Secretary of Cabinet, Rebecca Kitteridge, was seconded into the GCSB to report on the agency’s compliance systems and processes. Kitteridge spent six months with the GCSB, reviewing the lawfulness of the activities conducted and the agency’s compliance framework. The Kitteridge Report was released 9 April 2013 and highlighted the GCSB’s lack of good compliance systems and processes as well as underlying organisational problems. The report made eighty recommendations focusing on legislative reform to “clarify the application of the GCSB Act 2003 to the GCSB’s work,” and the implementation of a compliance framework. Since the Kitteridge Report was released, the GCSB has committed

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47 Ibid., 9 and Appendix One.
itself to improving its internal structures in order to gain more confidence from the public. A number of recommendations were to be implemented over the course of a few years. The most transparent was the 2013 “Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill.” The Bill provided a statutory framework outlining the agency’s functions, powers, controls and limitations, taking effect 27 September 2013. The Kitteridge Report reflects of the GCSB’s efforts to ensure external oversight occurs at the highest level possible.

**An Independent Agency or an Anglo-American Domination?**

The capabilities of New Zealand’s SIGINT community are a result of the historical relationship the nation has with Britain and, indirectly, the United States. Although initially the product of Anglo-American wishes, the GCSB has developed into an independent agency important to New Zealand as a nation, whilst honouring its commitments to the UK-USA intelligence and security community. Once a partner subject to dominant Anglo-American wishes, New Zealand has recently begun to display the capabilities of an independent actor.

As Commonwealth allegiances saw New Zealand committed to Britain, it seems only natural that the establishment of New Zealand’s SIGINT community was a product of the British regime. Initial developments within New Zealand’s field of SIGINT followed British direction and were ultimately in accordance with the strategy and intentions of the Commonwealth. In terms of defence, both New Zealand and Australia provide Britain with strong allies in the South Pacific. The JIB and the NZCSO were established, structured and maintained by British personnel, to meet the needs of the British Commonwealth’s defence strategy. Simply put, New Zealand’s SIGINT agency was initially a by-product of its British counterpart.

However, Anglo-American relations were also dominated by the United States at the beginning of UK-USA cooperation. The United States possessed more power over the economically weakened Britain at the outset of the Cold War. With Cold War apprehensions driving United States foreign policy, Britain maintained an

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essential all. A rising presence of SIGINT throughout international relations naturally resulted in the allegiance of the two countries’ agencies, driven by United States Cold War policies. Britain, and thus New Zealand, were committed to fighting the same war as the United States, adopting similar views and policies. The fear of communism and the “Red Scare” became apparent throughout New Zealand, parallel to developments in the United States. The Western world’s commitment to containing the spread of communism reflects the domination of the United States on the international stage.49 The first four decades of UK-USA cooperation, therefore, were dominated by the policies, wishes and beliefs of the United States. Britain’s resources were directed towards the Cold War and any perceived enemy of the West, and thus New Zealand was aligned towards these same policies. This alignment is further reflected through New Zealand’s contribution to the Vietnam War, fighting alongside the United States.

Since the 1980s, Anglo-American domination appears to have declined. Although still moderately dependent on their partners’ resources and funding, the GCSB has slowly begun to act as an independent agency participating in a beneficial alliance. The United States does not dominate the relationship to the extent they once did, with New Zealand demonstrating its independence through its prolonged stance against allowing nuclear armed and powered vessels in its ports. Still, the defence and security relationship between the United States and New Zealand was formally reinstated in 2010 and 2012 with the Washington and Wellington Declarations.50 Further, New Zealand has recently enacted legislation based on the democratic wishes of its populace, regardless of its UK-USA partners’ wishes. The GCSB Act passed in 2003, provides legislative oversight to the agency. In response to growing apprehension from New Zealand citizens, the 2003 GCSB Act was amended in 2013 to ensure effective external oversight and robust internal frameworks were in place throughout the agency. New Zealand’s active stance regarding its own policies, regardless of the wishes of its UK-USA partners, reflects the growing position

of the nation on the world stage. The GCSB has seen New Zealand develop from a partner dominated by Britain and the United States to a prominent actor in its own right within the UK-USA intelligence and security community.

Participation in the UK-USA intelligence and security community has provided New Zealand with significant benefits, albeit in reciprocation for a portion of national autonomy and a certain lack of transparency. The establishment of New Zealand’s first SIGINT organisation, NZCSO, and its successor, the GCSB, has provided the nation with adequate security and defence measures relevant to the present day. However, such benefits can be over shadowed by the controversial sacrifices – those seeming to reduce New Zealand citizens’ democratic freedoms.
CONCLUSION:

The Case for the GCSB

Involvement in the UK-USA intelligence and security community continues to benefit New Zealand on a daily basis. The role the GCSB plays in maintaining the nation’s security and international relations is significant and often goes unnoticed by the general populace. Indeed, New Zealand’s security and defence forces are often criticised by the public. Participation in the UK-USA Agreement has naturally resulted in the sacrifice of portions of national sovereignty and democratic transparency. These are significant implications of an international alliance, requiring constant monitoring and revision. In saying this, the benefits New Zealand gains through commitment to the UK-USA Agreement significantly outweigh the sacrifices. Further, the UK-USA Agreement has established one of the most significant international alliances, one which has endured for over sixty years despite changes in the geopolitical environment. New Zealand’s involvement with SIGINT collection and allegiances stemming from this are an essential aspect of national security.

The Benefits

New Zealand’s participation in the UK-USA intelligence and security community has resulted in the establishment of New Zealand’s own world class SIGINT collection and analysis bureau, the GCSB. Britain and the United States have successfully established a capable and advanced agency in a nation which lacked sufficient finances, resources and expert personnel. New Zealand has acquired a structured organisation based on the world’s most successful SIGINT agencies, outfitted with technology, exceptionally trained personnel and four partners committed to the security of New Zealand. New Zealand’s small economy and geographically isolated position makes it vulnerable to security threats. The GCSB provides counter measures to such security threats, whist providing New Zealand with an institution capable of participating in the UK-USA intelligence and security community.
New Zealand benefits economically and in terms of resources through participation with the UK-USA community. The distribution of SIGINT collection throughout the five nations decreases the costs for each nation. It would be uneconomic, and potentially impossible, for nations to individually collect and analyse all SIGINT from around the globe relevant to their security.¹ The ability to access information gathered from its partners around the world greatly enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of New Zealand’s intelligence community, and those of its partners. Thus, each nation gains comparative advantages through participation with the UK-USA community.

New Zealand’s initial alliance with the UK-USA nations is an example of what political theorists term “bandwagoning.”² New Zealand’s commitment to ANZUS provides a good example – where due to possible threats from South-East Asia, Australia and New Zealand allied with the United States to enhance their military power over potential adversaries in the region. Correlated to ANZUS is New Zealand’s alliance with the UK-USA Agreement. Due to the growing significance of intelligence during the Cold War, New Zealand required alliance with the United States and Britain to enhance their own defence capabilities. This may establish New Zealand as a weaker state in the alliance, but increases the collective power of UK-USA participating states over their adversaries. In the present international environment, the ever present and unpredictable threats of terrorism and cyber warfare continue to drive foreign policies. The UK-USA community need to pool their resources to gain collective power over their adversaries. The establishment of the GCSB provides New Zealand with the ability to individually monitor these threats at a micro level, with macro level support from greater powers when required. New Zealand is no longer just “bandwagoning,” but is now contributing to the alliance in a manner beneficial for all participants. Thus, alliance with the UK-USA states initially enhanced New Zealand’s power, but also provided the resources to develop its own capabilities.

Initial reasoning for forming an alliance is always aimed at benefitting a nation. Alliance with another state generally enhances power, status and resources

of all parties in some manner. The UK-USA Agreement has established a global network of intelligence and security, increasing the security of all nations involved. During the Cold War, the alliance provided enhanced power and knowledge for all UK-USA states against communism and the Soviet Union. The changing geopolitical environment of the post-Cold War era has changed the function of the agreement – it has become a defensive alliance for the twenty first century. A defensive alliance aims to guarantee support of member states if one falls under attack from another state. A strong defensive alliance, such as the UK-USA community, acts a deterrence to hostile attacks. Effectively, it prevents an adversary from attacking any member states due to the strength of the collective power of the allied nations. The capabilities of the UK-USA intelligence and security community are significantly stronger than any single state or terrorist organisation in the current political environment. The only significant threat to the UK-USA SIGINT community would require another alliance of states. Although possible, it would take a significant period of time to establish an alliance powerful enough. Alliance with the UK-USA community has provided another avenue of security and defence for New Zealand since its formation. Coupled with military alliances such as ANZUS and SEATO, New Zealand has had a more than adequate form of security and defence for over sixty years.

The Sacrifices

Participation within an international alliance requires sacrifices for all parties. Alliance theorists believe that a robust alliance is generally asymmetrical – one party will be significantly more powerful than the other. For this to occur, the weaker party sacrifices portions of national autonomy to gain the benefits the stronger party can provide. In New Zealand’s case, portions of national autonomy are lost in order to gain the benefits of cooperation with the UK-USA community. This loss of national

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4 Walt, 156; Tow and Albinski, 155.
5 Walt, 164, 158.
autonomy is a controversial issue for New Zealand and has generated criticism regarding the nation’s participation with the UK-USA community.

Nicky Hager is a prominent advocate for New Zealand to leave the UK-USA intelligence alliance. He stresses New Zealand’s increasing lack of autonomy in what he considers an Anglo-American dominated relationship. Hager believes that for New Zealand to establish an independent foreign policy, the nation must sever intelligence alliances. Yet he neglects to mention that in the developing, multi-national and interactive world of the late twentieth and early twenty first century, being a fully autonomous country is not a benefit, but a loss. A nation’s foreign policy is largely influenced by the intelligence given to policy makers and for policy makers to make well informed decisions, a state needs as much information as possible, essentially information gained through international alliances such as the UK-USA community. Intelligence cooperation, despite the loss of autonomy, is one of the best, most responsible ways for states to maintain their security in the modern age. As scholar Michael Herman highlights “international exchanges are necessary for international society.”

As a smaller nation, New Zealand’s intelligence demands are relatively less compared to those of Britain or the United States. A frequent misconception coming from critics such as Hager is that New Zealand does not gain equal reciprocation from its partners relative to its loss of autonomy. New Zealand has committed itself to an alliance based on exchange and cooperation, and if anything, the smaller nation gains more than it loses through the UK-USA Agreement. The sacrifice of national autonomy is reciprocated through the security and defence resources its UK-USA partners provide. The information gained from greater powers is collected from stations around the world, which realistically New Zealand could not access alone. New Zealand exchanges SIGINT collected within its own geographical proximity. Such information is relevant for the nation’s own security and foreign policy matters, as

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8 Herman, 152.
9 Ibid., 216.
10 Hager, 248-249.
11 Richelson and Ball, 303-304.
well as of interest to its partners. An important condition for an alliance to endure is the extent of comparative advantage each party extracts from another. If reciprocation is viewed as unequal, alliances collapse due to one state providing more than it gains.12 The UK-USA Agreement has endured for more than sixty years despite developments within the international environment since its establishment. Thus, each party must still believe that the benefits gained adequately outweigh the sacrifices made for the agreement to have continued for such a prolonged period.

The extent to which UK-USA nations lose aspects of national sovereignty through their alliance provides both benefits and liabilities. Commitments to an overarching community decreases an individual state’s ability to formulate their own foreign policies and make decisions based on their own needs. On the other hand, cooperation and support creates a larger, stronger and safer international environment. Loss of national sovereignty is further enshrined in the actions of UK-USA participating nations towards each other. Although committed to support and assistance, each nation is still primarily concerned with their own interests and people – so the member states are also monitoring each other. Trust can only go so far, and when national interests conflict it becomes essential to be aware of an ally’s intentions. By monitoring each other, the UK-USA nations are simply keeping one another in check – creating their own limits and expectations through continuous access to the others’ SIGINT knowledge. Not only does such monitoring reflect a proportionate loss of national sovereignty, it also represents the prominence of state interests over the supranational community. Thus, the consequences of participation in the UK-USA community must be weighed up – any loss of national sovereignty is more than adequately offset by the benefits gained through participation in the UK-USA intelligence and security community.

Shared political values are an influential factor in the resilience of an alliance.13 All UK-USA participating states are Western democracies committed to their citizens’ wishes and governmental transparency. A strong criticism continuously overshadowing the UK-USA intelligence and security community is the lack of

12 Tow and Albinski, 155-156.
13 Walt, 168-169.
democratic transparency of intelligence agencies. SIGINT provides the opportunity to monitor both foreign and domestic communications, potentially prioritising governmental powers over the democratic freedoms of citizens. However there is a fine line regarding the limits of transparency and what needs to be classified for national security. The very nature of intelligence collection, cooperation and security interests, often requires concealment from public knowledge. Throughout the UK-USA community the extent of transparency for intelligence agencies and their actions is continuously questioned. Classic democratic values aim to make institutions available for public evaluation, ensuring interests of the populace are always at the forefront. Transparency for intelligence and defence agencies will always be limited, contradicting democratic governance. Further, the ability of a government to classify and decide what information needs to be shared is one potential route to authoritarian leadership.

To ensure democratic values are respected, the UK-USA participating nations have taken responsibility to provide external oversight throughout intelligence agencies. As previously mentioned, New Zealand has implemented specific legislation and committees providing external oversight to increase the transparency of the GCSB and similar agencies. The transparency of governmental institutions is highly valued by all democratic parties to the UK-USA Agreement. However, states must balance the loss of transparency with their national security interests. To minimise any losses, states have implemented oversight mechanisms they believe are adequate enough to preserve democratic rights without sacrificing national security interests.

Despite the GCSB’s commitment to efficient external oversight, there are those who believe the agency is working outside of New Zealand’s law. American journalist Glenn Greenwald has recently claimed that the GCSB conducts mass surveillance on New Zealand citizens due to its commitments to the UK-USA

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14 Hager, 228; Richelson and Ball, 309-311.
Agreement, reigniting sceptical discussion regarding New Zealand’s participation with the community.\textsuperscript{16} However, the Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, and its 2013 amendments, outline the illegality of monitoring New Zealand citizens. The GCSB’s external oversight mechanisms aim to ensure the agency complies within the law of New Zealand to protect its citizens from such activities.\textsuperscript{17} Regardless of the persistent charges from critics like Greenwald, and the existence of Edward Snowden’s major leak of the United States’ SIGINT documents, there is still no concrete evidence that the mass surveillance of New Zealanders occurs. Such accusations are merely suppositions which place the UK-USA participating states under scrutiny.

\textit{The UK-USA Agreement in Perspective}

The UK-USA Agreement is an alliance of five nations which has endured over sixty years of successful cooperation. The Cold War fears that once drove the nations to align have since ceased and are replaced with the threats of terrorism, cyber warfare and the continuous repercussions of globalisation. International relations theorists often understand alliances as a response to an external threat, which typically dissolve when a significant shift in the level or nature of the threat occurs.\textsuperscript{18} Yet, despite the significant shift in both threat and the geopolitical environment, the UK-USA Agreement has persevered. Similar to the endurance of the ANZUS alliance, the significance of the UK-USA Agreement can be highlighted through its ability to overcome traditional reasons for the collapse of an alliance.\textsuperscript{19} The four conditions of alliance politics which can determine the endurance or dissolution of an alliance can be applied to the UK-USA Agreement for complete understanding of the significance of the alliance within international relations.

\textsuperscript{17} “External Oversight,” Government Communications Security Bureau.
\textsuperscript{18} Walt, 158.
\textsuperscript{19} Tow and Albinski, 154, 156.
First, the original reason for alliance of the UK-USA states. States often align to aggregate power – either by enhancing their own or countering attempts by their adversary to do the same.\textsuperscript{20} The United States and Britain established the cooperation of the UK-USA Agreement throughout World War Two to enhance their collective security, offensive capabilities and their positions of power relative to the Axis alliance. The expanding threat of communism and the tensions of the Cold War environment resulted in the need for the two powers to continue their alliance, specifically aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies. Inclusion of Canada, Australia and New Zealand resulted from previous Commonwealth ties, yet further enhanced the power and abilities of each nation without any significant costs. The aggregation of power, especially in defence matters, has maintained its relevance into the twenty first century. Despite a significant shift in both the political and security environment since its inception, the initial reasoning for alliance of the UK-USA states remains – the cooperation of SIGINT abilities to enhance the security of each states and the strength of the alliance against its adversaries.

The second condition likely to determine the endurance of an alliance is how much comparative advantage allies extract from each other.\textsuperscript{21} Alliance theorist Stephen Walt believes that the durability of an alliance is related to the “exercise of hegemonic power by a strong alliance leader.” Walt theorises that alliance leaders can encourage durability by bearing a disproportionate share of the costs.\textsuperscript{22} The UK-USA community is dominated the United States and Britain, whom share a much larger burden of the costs than the smaller parties. Although on paper the two parties are equal, Britain’s economic struggles after World War Two allowed the United States supreme reign over intelligence activities of the Western alliance, driven by the country’s hostility toward communism. Informally, the United States is the hegemonic party over Britain. However when the two powers align within the UK-USA Agreement, they collectively become the hegemonic leaders over the three smaller parties. The alliance with the smaller nations is also in the interests of the larger powers, although the benefits may differ. Such a disproportion of costs

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 155; Walt, 157.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Walt, 164.
encourages durability of the UK-USA Agreement as Canada, Australia and New Zealand are benefitting more than they sacrifice, whilst the United States and Britain are enhancing their power through these allies, despite the increased costs. Thus, the comparative advantages for each state of the UK-USA Agreement has maintained at a stable equilibrium, enabling the alliance to endure.

A third concept of alliance durability is the threat of entrapment or abandonment. States commonly fear being pulled into their ally’s conflicts contradicting their own interests, or that their ally will not fulfil their commitments in times of crises. If either of these occur to a significant extent, the alliance is likely to collapse. Entrapment and abandonment are important concepts relevant to the UK-USA Agreement. Through the exchange of SIGINT, there is a significant possibility that a member state is collecting intelligence relevant for their partners’ interests, often conflicting with their own interests. A topical example is the collection of SIGINT from New Zealand bases regarding the interests of the United States conflicts throughout the Middle East. Essentially, New Zealand is honouring their commitment to the alliance they are a prominent part of, despite the nation’s views towards the conflict. From this perspective, New Zealand is indirectly supporting United States military action in the Middle East. However, the alliance goes both ways with the United States likely to support New Zealand when necessary. The fear of entrapment or abandonment can dictate the endurance of an alliance. These two conditions have a strong chance of effecting the UK-USA alliance due to the continuous significance of SIGINT for foreign policy matters. Despite these chances, efforts to reinforce both equal reciprocation and the commitment of member states has enabled the UK-USA Agreement to endure for over sixty years.

The final condition relative to the longevity of the UK-USA Agreement is the adaptability of the alliance. A robust alliance requires flexibility and the ability to adapt to a changing environment. If an alliance is focused on a specific threat, which many are, the alliance is likely to collapse if the threat changes. The UK-USA Agreement has adapted to the changing political environment since its

23 Tow and Albinski, 156; Walt, 159-160; Snyder, 466-468.
25 Tow and Albinski, 156; Walt. 158-160.
establishment. Initial threats of the Cold War, specifically communist forces and the Soviet Union, have been replaced with developing technological threats of terrorism and cyber warfare. The flexibility of SIGINT to encompass numerous aspects of foreign policy and security, ranging from diplomatic communications to cyber security, has enabled the UK-USA alliance to adapt into the twenty first century.

**Significance and Maintenance of the UK-USA Agreement**

The significance of the UK-USA Agreement, and New Zealand’s participation within it, can be further understood by imagining a world *without* the Agreement. Technology not only has a prominent place in the every-day lives of people but has driven foreign security measures for the last sixty years. Without the exchange of SIGINT, individual nations would be limited in their knowledge of the surrounding world. Few nations could collect and evaluate global SIGINT, relevant to their security, economy and diplomacy demands, in an adequate manner. The speed and capabilities of technology have made this task near impossible. Without the cooperation of the UK-USA community, the individual participants would be lacking important information vital for their security and national interests. National security would diminish, placing citizens at a higher risk of danger.

A common mistake is the evaluation of the Agreement during peace time. It becomes easy to believe that the world is stable, and the monitoring, collection and dissemination of SIGINT is unnecessary. However, the continued activities of the UK-USA intelligence and security community contribute to the world stability to which people have become so accustomed. The UK-USA Agreement is just as significant in peace time as in war, acting as a pre-emptive measure of defence. Moreover, if an attack were to occur against New Zealand without the security the UK-USA community provides, the government’s failure to provide adequate defence would be criticised. Further, the vital intelligence SIGINT provides during a conflict, from the enemy’s location to warfare capabilities, would be limited due to a lack of resources,

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26 Richelson and Ball, 301-304.
finances and manpower. Thus, the UK-USA Agreement is a significant aspect of New Zealand’s defence measures in both peace and war time.

The UK-USA Agreement is a unique alliance of five Western democracies exchanging intelligence information. Against common theorists and conceptions of alliance politics, the UK-USA community has endured for a substantial amount of time without any large repercussions for its member states. Despite the changes in the geopolitical environment, the capabilities of SIGINT and the external threats to UK-USA community, the alliance has been maintained. The endurance and continued relevance of the UK-USA Agreement reflects the significance of the alliance, encouraging both its maintenance in the future, and New Zealand’s participation within.

**Conclusion**

The topical relevance of New Zealand’s participation in the UK-USA Agreement demanded a review of the agreement and its significance for international politics. The UK-USA Agreement established a multi-lateral alliance in response to the hostilities of the looming Cold War. Despite large developments in the geopolitical environment, the alliance has endured for over sixty years. Declassification of the original documents regarding the Agreement has enabled increased transparency and the ability of academics to provide their own analysis of the alliance.

As the smaller party to the Agreement, New Zealand’s participation lacks significant recognition. Historical allegiance to the UK-USA Agreement has provided New Zealand with benefits that significantly outweigh the sacrifices made. Any loss of national autonomy is reimbursed through both the independence gained from the establishment of a national SIGINT agency, and the wider security commitments of other UK-USA participating nations. By surrendering a portion of national sovereignty, the nation gained an independent world-class SIGINT agency capable of maintaining New Zealand’s defence and security. Further, alliance with world powers Britain and the United States sufficiently benefits New Zealand, enhancing the nation’s defence and security capabilities. The large degree of deterrence
participation with the UK-USA community provides also contributes to the stability of the nation’s security, overriding the proportion of national autonomy lost. The controversial issue regarding the extent of transparency of intelligence agencies can be counter balanced with the importance of national security. The activities of the GCSB provide New Zealand’s first line of national defence in the current technologically driven era. Although transparency is necessary in a democratic state, foreign policies and commitments are always prioritising national defence. External oversight ensures defence institutions do not abuse their power, but restricted transparency is ultimately benefitting the nation. The threat to national security if all intelligence information was transparent significantly outweighs citizens’ democratic freedoms. Further, the unique alliance has persevered against traditional theories of alliance politics, reinforcing the significance of the UK-USA Agreement within international relations. The UK-USA Agreement is an important alliance for both New Zealand to participate within, and for participating nations to maintain in the growing technological world.
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